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A COMPENDIUM OF MAJOR
CALIFORNIA JUVENILE LAW
DECISIONS WITH BRIEF
ANALYSES, 1979

Society has been plagued with the problem of whether the police, the courts
and the correctionagencies are to administerjuveniles for their protection
and treatment, or for their punishment. To facilitate a better understanding ofjuvenile administrationthe authors have analyzed the Californiajuvenile law casesfor the year 1979. The article consists of six major areas of
interest; parent-child custody, sentencing, procedure,jurisdiction, evidentiary and constitutional which will be used to highlight some of the more
significant decisions in the past year, thus enabling the reader to assess
changes occurring in the juvenile system.

A COMPENDIUM OF RECENT CALIFORNIA JUVENILE LAW
CASES
CASE NAME

CITATION

HOLDING

I. PARENT-CHILD CUSTODY
1.

In re W.O.

88 Cal. App. 3d 906, 152
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1979).

Possession of cocaine
and marijuana by the
parents did not justify
loss of custody.

2.

In re Fred J.

89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152
Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979).

The mother does not
have standing to invoke
the psychotherapist - patient privilege of her children.

CITATION

HOLDING

90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153
Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979).

A new cause of action for
negligence did not arise
where a social agency
could not find a minor an
adoptive home.

91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154
Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979).

State may permanently
sever the parent-child relationship when certain
clear and convincing evidence is established.

91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 154
Cal. Rptr. 87 (1979).

If a minor is not formally
a party to a dissolution in
which paternity is established, the paternity determination is not binding on the child.

6. In re Lynna B.

92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 155
Cal. Rptr. 256 (1979).

Foster parents subsequently appointed as
guardians are still within
the supervision of the juvenile court.

7.

In re Nicole B.

93 Cal. App. 3d 874, 155
Cal. Rptr. 916 (1979).

A juvenile court has jurisdiction where there is
evidence of physical
abuse of a child by a
custodian, parent, or
guardian.

8.

In re LaShonda B.

95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 157
Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979).

A child may be removed
from the custody of one
parent and given to the
other upon a showing
that the parent is capable
of having custody.

98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 159
Cal. Rptr. 460 (1979).

Parent was unfit to retain
child custody after having committed a crime
showing unfitness.

In re Harm R.

88 Cal. App. 3d 438, 152
Cal. Rptr. 167 (1979).

A minor may not be held
in physical confinement
for a period longer than
required for the underlying crime; physical confinement expressly includes juvenile hall.

11.

In re Carrie W.

89 Cal. App. 3d 642, 152
Cal. Rptr. 690 (1979).

The purpose of juvenile
court law is rehabilitation, not punishment.

12.

In re Maurice S.

90 Cal. App. 3d 190, 153
Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979).

Denial of precommitment
credit to a minor confined to the CYA constitutes a violation of equal
protection.

CASE NAME
3.

Smith v. Alameda
County Social Services Agency

4. In re David B.

5.

Ruddock v. Ohls

9. In re Geoffrey G.

SENTENCING
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CASE NAME

CITATION

HOLDING

13.

In re James V.

90 Cal. App. 3d 300, 153
Cal. Rptr. 334 (1979).

The CYA has the function of determining the
amount of time which a
minor must serve in custody or on parole.

14.

In re Richard W.

91 Cal. App. 3d 960, 155
Cal. Rptr. 11 (1979).

Court is limited to fixing
maximum period of confinement in the absence
of a supplemental petition showing the ineffectiveness of previous dispositions.

15.

In re Robert S.

92 Cal. App. 3d 355, 154
Cal. Rptr. 832 (1979).

The maximum term of
physical confinement
may be determined with
reference to previously
sustained petitions.

16.

In re Isaac G.

93 Cal. App. 3d 917, 156
Cal. Rptr. 123 (1979).

A minor is not deprived
of equal protection of the
laws when a juvenile
court orders confinement
for the longest of three
time periods without a
showing of aggravated
circumstances as required for adults.

17.

In re John R.

94 Cal. App. 3d 566, 155
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1979).

Requiring a longer period
of probation for juveniles
than adults does not violate equal protection of
the law.

18.

People v. Carl B.

24 Cal. 3d 212, 594 P.2d 14,
155 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1979).

A CYA recommendation
that a minor be committed to a Youth Authority
rather than prison is not
binding on the court, but
is entitled to great
weight.

19.

In re Robert D.

95 Cal. App. 3d 767, 157
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1979).

Subsequent illegal acts
dissipate any taint
caused by an initial unauthorized police action.
Imposition of a maximum
term for such illegal acts
does not violate equal
protection of the laws.

CASE NAME

CITATION

HOLDING

20.

In re Johnny G.

96 Cal. App. 3d 289, 158
Cal. Rptr. 68 (1979).

Denial of precommitment
credit to a minor confined to camp does not
violate equal protection
of the law.

21.

In re Todd W.

96 Cal. App. 3d 408, 157
Cal. Rptr. 802 (1979).

Auto theft did not justify
commitment to the CYA.

22.

In re Ruben M.

96 Cal. App. 3d 690, 158
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1979).

Prior offenses may be
used in determining the
minor's period of confinement.

23.

In re Eric J.

25 Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d
549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317.

A provision imposing a
confinement period for a
minor which equals the
longest term that could
be imposed on an adult
for the same offense is
not a denial of equal protection even though aggravating circumstances
are not shown.

24.

In re Jeanice D.

98 Cal. App. 3d 965, 159
Cal. Rptr. 788 (1979).

A term of 25 years to life
does not require a minor
to be sent to the CYA for
evaluation.

III.

PROCEDURE

25. In re Jonathan S.

88 Cal. App. 3d 468, 151
Cal. Rptr. 810 (1979).

Ex parte contacts between judge and attorney
were improper, but did
not prejudice the case.

26.

In re Richard C.

89 Cal. App. 3d 477, 152
Cal. Rptr. 787 (1979).

Court allowed review by
writ where there was no
danger of retrial.

27.

In re Frank F.

90 Cal. App. 3d 383, 153
Cal. Rptr. 375 (1979).

In determining which
statute is applicable, the
juvenile court will look to
legislative intent.

28.

In re Owen E.

23 Cal. 3d 398, 529 P.2d
720, 154 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1979).

Juvenile court may not
vacate a proper commitment to CYA unless it
appears that the CYA
failed to comply with the
law.

29.

In re Jimmy M.

93 Cal. App. 3d 369, 155
Cal. Rptr. 534 (1979).

The juvenile court must
inform a minor of the
possible consequences of
an admission.
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CITATION

HOLDING

30.

In re Mary Jo. D.

95 Cal. App. 3d 34, 156
Cal. Rptr. 829 (1979).

A juvenile court may not
use criminal contempt as
a basis for elevating what
would be a Welfare and
Institutions Code section
601 offense to a section
602 offense.

31.

Craig LaMont S. v.
Superior Court of
L.A. County

95 Cal. App. 3d 568, 157
Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979).

A change of lawyers by
the court constituted an
abuse of judicial discretion.

32.

In re Steven B.

25 Cal. 3d 1, 598 P.2d 480,
157 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1979).

When the records of a
jurisdictional hearing are
inadvertently destroyed,
the minor is entitled to a
new jurisdictional hearing.

33.

In re Adolphus T.

96 Cal. App. 3d 642, 158
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1979).

Failure to warn minor of
his rights only constituted technical error and
was thus harmless.

34.

In re Freddie R.

96 Cal. App. 3d 829, 158
Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979).

On an application for rehearing, the court must
specify its reasons for a
delay on its determination.

35.

In re Ray 0.

97 Cal. App. 3d 136, 158
Cal. Rptr. 550 (1979).

Failure to provide a transcript at a dispositional
hearing was prejudicial
error.

36.

In re Glen J.

97 Cal. App. 3d 981, 159
Cal. Rptr. 148 (1979).

Modification of a disposition order did not require
the filing of a supplemental petition.

37.

In re Michael C.

98 Cal. App. 3d 117, 159
Cal. Rptr. 306 (1979).

Delay in production of
transcripts was not adequate to establish good
cause to allow extension
or petition.

89 Cal. App. 3d 804, 152
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1979).

Juvenile court did not
lose jurisdiction over unsentenced juvenile offenses when an 18 year
old was sentenced as an
adult.

JURISDICTION
In re Donald B.

CASE NAME

CITATION

HOLDING

39. In re Carlo S.

94 Cal. App. 3d 377, 156
Cal. Rptr. 442 (1979).

Where a minor remains
silent and makes no objection to the procedure,
the juvenile court may
not, without appropriate
amendment or previous
notice to the minor, find
the minor guilty of uncharged and unincluded
lessor offenses.

40. People v. Superior
Court (John D.)

95 Cal. App. 3d 380, 157
Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979).

The juvenile court exceeds its jurisdiction by
making an indefinite
commitment pursuant to
a finding of mere dependency.

41.

In re Vicki H.

99 Cal. App. 3d 484, 160
Cal. Rptr. 294 (1979).

Insanity defense on successfully proven diverts
the court of juvenile jurisdiction.

V.

EVIDENCE

42. In re Darrel T.

90 Cal. App. 3d 325, 153
Cal. Rptr. 261 (1979).

Minor was not allowed to
review the transcript of a
fitness hearing involving
a codefendant.

43. In re Clyde H.

92 Cal. App. 3d 338, 154
Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979).

The legislature may set
forth the standard by
which a minor will be
found capable of committing a crime.

44. In re Charles G.

95 Cal. App. 3d 62, 156
Cal. Rptr. 832 (1979).

Circumstantial evidence
was sufficient to show a
youth had committed
auto burglary.

45. In re David G.

93 Cal. App. 3d 247, 155
Cal. Rptr. 500 (1979).

Requiring a minor to litigate search and seizure
issues at an adjudication
hearing does not violate
equal protection of the
law.

46. In re Frederick G.

96 Cal. App. 3d 353, 157
Cal. Rptr. 769 (1979).

Corroboration of an accomplice's testimony is
not applicable to juvenile
court proceedings.

47. In re Johnny G.

25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d
196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180
(1979).

Extrajudicial
identification that cannot
be confirmed at trial is
not sufficient to sustain
conviction in the absence
of other evidence.

48. In re Joseph H.

98 Cal. App. 3d 627, 159
Cal. Rptr. 681 (1979).

Right to a jury trial is
inapplicable to juvenile
court proceedings.
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CITATION

HOLDING

VI. CONSTI E'UTONAL
49.

In re Sco tt K.

24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d
105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1979).

Parents of a minor may
not summarily waive
their child's right to
search and seizure protections.

50.

In re Edward B.

94 Cal. App. 3d 362, 156
Cal. Rptr. 405 (1979).

A minor who has had an
adjudication hearing
before a juvenile court
and whose petition for
rehearing is denied by a
superior court judge has
had a "determinative
hearing by a judge."

51.

In re Kathy P.

25 Cal. 3d 91, 599 P.2d 65,
157 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1979).

The hearing of a contested traffic violation by
a juvenile traffic hearing
officer is constitutional
because the hearing officer is performing a
subordinate judicial duty.

52.

Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County

25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d
572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1979).

"Statutory Rape" statute
does not violate the
equal protection clause.

53.

In re Wayne J.

97 Cal. App. 3d 776, 159
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1979).

Imposition of home probation on minor for possession of marijuana
does not violate the
equal protection clause.

54.

In re Jesse W.

26 Cal. 3d 41, 603 P.2d
1296, 160 Cal. Rptr. 700
(1979).

A minor is subjected to
double jeopardy if a juvenile court judge conducts
a de novo rehearing subsequent to the referee's
initial findings.

I.

PARENT-CHILD CUSTODY
1.

IN RE W.O.

88 Cal. App. 3d 906, 152 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1979)
W.O. and T.O., minors, were removed from the custody of their
parents after cocaine and marijuana had been discovered at their
residence. The evidence indicated that four-month-old T.O. and
his two-year-old brother, W.O., were receiving excellent physical

care in the home and that the parents were deeply concerned
about the children.
The trial court concluded that having those drugs in the home
created the possibility of harm or injury to the children. The parents appealed an order removing the two minor children from
their custody.
At issue was whether the trial court may remove a child from
parental custody when there is a "remote possibility" that the
children may be endangered in their present environment.'
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeal relied upon In re
Robert p.2 The court said: "The right to custody of one's own
children, free from unwarranted state interference, has long been
recognized as a fundamental right."3 As a fundamental right, a
showing of a compelling state interest is required in order to justify the taking of the children.
The court also relied on another case, In re B.G. 4 where the
supreme court said:
[W]e conclude that section 4600 permits the juvenile court to award custody to a non parent against the claim of a parent only upon a clear showing that such award is essential to avert harm to the child. A finding that
the "best interests" of the "welfare of the
such an award will promote
'5
child will not suffice."

The court concluded that there was no evidence supporting the
conclusion that parental custody would actually harm the children. 6 The court pointed out that "[fJundamental rights do not
'7
fade before remote possibilities."

2. IN RE FRED J.
89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979)
A petition was ified under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 3878 and 388,9 to remove custody of two dependent children
1. In re W.O., 88 Cal. App. 3d 906, 907, 152 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (1979).
2. Id. at 911, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (citing In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310,
132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976)).
3. In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 319-20 n.9, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5, 11 n.9 (1976)
(citations omitted).
4. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 909, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (citing 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d
244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974)).
5. Id. at 698-699, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58. The applicable parts
of California Civil Code section 4600 state:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other than a parent, without the consent of parents, it must make a
finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the
child and the award to a non parent is required to serve the best interests
of the child ....
CAL. Crv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1979).
6. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
7. Id.
8. The applicable part of Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 provides
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from their mother. The petition alleged that the mother refused
to adequately cooperate with the social worker to provide an appropriate environment for the children. Separate attorneys were
appointed to represent the mother and the children.1O
Over the objection of the mother, two psychiatrists testified as
to the children's emotional problems. The juvenile court declared
the minors to be dependent children under Welfare and Institution Code section 300.11
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal found that the
mother did not have standing to raise the issue of invoking the
children's psychotherapist-patient privilege.12 The court determined "[tihere was no 'privity' between the mother and the children; each had separate counsel, and their interests were not at
all identical, indeed were largely divergent."' 3 The court could
find no reason to depart from this general rule.14
The court also held that "a petition for modification ... is judged by a preponderance of the evidence standard,' 5 ... whereas a
supplemental petition is judged by the same standard as the original proceeding."' 6 Where a child may be removed from his/her
parent's custody under a section 300 hearing, the level of evidence
that an "order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor from
the physical custody of a parent ... and directing placement in a foster home, or
commitment to a private institution ... shall be made only after noticed hearing
upon a supplemental petition." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 387 (West Supp. 1979).
9. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE section 388 provides in pertinent part:

Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court or the child himself ...

may, upon

grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in
the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child...
for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously
made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court....
10. Pursuant to CA.. RULES OF COURT 1363(c).
11. The applicable part of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 provides:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and
has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise
or capable of exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guardian
actually exercising such care or control.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

12.
13.
14.
15.
(West
16.

§ 300 (West Supp. 1979).

In re Fred J., 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 179, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327, 332 (1979).
Id.
Id.
89 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 329. See also CAL EviD. CODE § 115
1966).
89 Cal. App. 3d at 174, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 329.

necessary "requires application of the clear and convincing evi17
dence standard."
3.

SMITH V. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY

90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979)
The Alameda County Social Services Agency placed "seventeen-year-old Dennis in a series of foster homes but no one
adopted him."' 8 "The agency left him with one set of foster parents for several years without asking them whether they wanted
to adopt Dennis."' 9 Dennis charged the agency with negligence in
failing to take reasonable actions to bring about Dennis' adoption.
At issue was whether a new cause of action arose creating liability upon a public adoption agency for negligent failure to find
2
an infant an adoptive home. 0
In holding that a new cause of action did not arise the court
looked at the "duty of care." 21 The First District Court of Appeals
stated; "The existence or absence of a duty cannot be determined
by mechanical or formal tests." 22 Instead, the court chose to base
23
liability in negligence upon consideration of public policy.
"'[D]uty' is not sacrosant in itself, but only an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
24
say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."
The court concluded that "[wJhen we apply the various considerations of policy we find that they militate strongly against liability." 25 "The duty sought to be imposed by Dennis does not
present a reasonably clear or manageable standard for assessing
26
the wrongfulness of the agency's conduct."
Whether an agency could or should have done something different with
regard to the placement of any of the many children who received foster
17. Id. See also In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976); In
re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978).
18. Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 934,
153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (1979).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 935, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 714. The court determined that no new cause of
action arose, so the issue of governmental immunity became unimportant. Id. at
939, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 717. See A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILrrY 143 (1964).
21. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 935, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 935, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 714-15 (citing Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist.,
218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963)).
24. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 935, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 715 (citing W. PROSSER, LAw OF
TORTS, 333 (3d ed. 1964)).
25. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 936, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 715.

26. Id.
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care but were not fortunate enough to be adopted would involve an inquiry of a highly speculative nature.
[U]nlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, social work
27
methodology provides no readily acceptable standards of care or cause.

The court construed the nature of the injury and damages to be
28
highly uncertain with respect to their cause and existence.

4. IN RE DAVID B.
91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979)
A judgment was entered by the trial court freeing forever David
B. from the parental custody and control of his mother. The identity of the child's father was not known. The proceeding was initiated pursuant to section 232 of the Civil Code, 29 to terminate the
parental relationship due to mental deficiency or mental illness of
the parent. 30 The mother had a long history of mental illness. After David was born he was taken into protective custody.
"ITIhere was no evidence that the mother had ever abused David
because he had never lived with her."31 However, "there was evidence of the mother's violent behavior toward her cats and her
neighbors. There was further evidence that the [mother] had neglected to obtain proper prenatal care and that her mental illness
had resulted in an impulsive, nomadic life style which was not
conducive" to raising a child.32 The trial court found that the
mother was and would remain incapable, in the foreseeable future, of supporting and controlling the child in a proper manner.
The court also found that available social services were not sufficient for the welfare of the child so as to enable the parent to
regain custody.3 3 The mother appealed contending that Civil
Code section 232, subdivision (a) (6)34 denied her substantive due
27. Id. at 937, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
28. Id. at 939-41, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18.
29. Section 232 deals with persons entitled to be declared free from parental
custody and control. Subdivision (a) (6) of this section is at issue and is set forth
in the following footnote. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1979).
30. In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 187, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65 (1975).
31. Id. at 191, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
32. Id. at 191-92, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
33. Id. at 198, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
34. Section 232(a) provides in pertinent part:
(6) Whose parents or parents are, and will remain incapable of supporting or controlling the child in a proper manner because of mental deficiency or mental illness, if there is testimony to this effect from two
physicians and surgeons each of which have been certified either by the

process in violation of the fourteenth amendment and California
Constitution article I, section 7, subdivision (a), in that it authorized a severing of the parental relationship without a showing of
actual neglect or mistreatment of the child.35
The appellate court stated that "[a] parent's interest in the
care, custody, and companionship of a child is a liberty to be
ranked among the most basic of civil rights"36 and that this liberty
is protected against unreasonable or arbitrary legislative governmental interference by substantive due process. 37 Therefore, the
parenting right may not be interfered with absent a compelling
38
state interest.
The court concluded that the legislature has determined that
when the parent is unable, due to mental illness, to properly care
for the child over an extended period of time, the child should be
placed for adoption so that it may obtain a stable home, rather
than remain in temporary foster care pending a possible return to
the custody of the parent. 39 The state is thereby attempting to
prevent permanent psychological harm which would result to the
minor if he was moved from various foster homes until he obtained majority.
The appellate court held that "the state may permanently sever
the parental relationship to free the child for adoption whenever
it is established by clear and convincing proof that because of a
mental illness or mental deficiency, the parents are and will remain incapable of providing the necessary support and control for
the child."40 Such a conclusion is reasonable and consistent with
substantive due process provided the trial court finds:
(1) on the basis of the consistent opinions of two physicians that the parAmerican Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or under Section 6750 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code....
CAL. CIM. CODE § 232(a) (6) (West Supp. 1979).
35. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 192-93, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69.
36. Id. at 193, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972)). The rights to conceive and raise one's children have been deemed essential, basic civil rights of citizens.
37. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 68. See also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
38. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 192, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
39. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 71. The court stated that the purpose behind section 232 proceedings was expounded by the legislature when it added section 232.9 to the Civil Code.
It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting this act to extend adoption services for the benefit of children residing in foster homes at public
expense by facilitating legal actions required for adoption so that these
children may be placed in adoptive homes where they will have the benefits of stability and security.
Id. (citing 1970 Cal. Stats. Ch. 583, § 1).
40. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
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ent's mental illness or deficiency is settled in that it will continue in the
foreseeable future regardless of any medical treatment that would be
available to the parent and (2) that the immediate severance of the parental relationship is the
4 1 least detrimental alternative available to protect the
welfare of the child.

Thus, section 232, subdivision (a) (6) does not violate substantive
due process.
5.

RUDDOCK V. OHLS

91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1979)
A divorce decree between Darrel and Diane Ohls was obtained
in an Oregon court. The decree stated that Darrel was not the father of the minor child. The child was not joined as a party to the
action nor was a guardian ad litem appointed. The decree indicated that the paternity and child support issues were fully litigated.42 In California, the mother petitioned for the appointment
of a guardian ad litem in order to bring an action to establish that
Darrel was the minor's father. A guardian was appointed and a
complaint filed. Darrel contended that the Oregon decree bound
the minor to said decree because the mother was acting in a full
representative capacity for the child. The trial court found for
Darrel and the minor appealed through her guardian ad litem.
The issue presented is whether the minor was bound by the pa43
ternity determination in the dissolution proceeding.
The appellate court stated that "the establishment of a parentchild relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses.
To hold a child bound . . . by a finding of nonpaternity in a divorce action in which the child was not a party would be to allow
the conduct of the mother to foreclose the most fundamental
right"" possessed by the child. The court held that in dealing
with the prospective rights of a minor to establish paternity, the
child, if not formally a party, is not bound by a paternity determination in a dissolution action. 45 There is a burden of proof to
show that the minor was a party to the action or in some other
41. Id.
42. Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 275, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87, 89 (1979).
43. Id. at 276, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
44. Id. at 277-78, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
45. Id. at 285, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 96. The court also stated that "(in contrast, in
an action for support under the Uniform Parentage Act formally brought on behalf
of the child, the judgment may be ... binding without actual joinder if the mother
acted in a proper representative capacity." Id.

manner46 is bound prospectively by the findings and judgment in
the parents' marital dissolution action.
6.

IN RE LYNNA

B.

92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1979)
When Lynna was young, her mother voluntarily placed her in
the home of licensed foster parents. With the mother's consent,
the foster parents were appointed guardians of Lynna. After several years the guardians became concerned for the general welfare of Lynna and were worried about the lack of stability in the
arrangement with Lynna's mother. The guardians petitioned the
superior court to declare the child free from the custody and control of her natural parents under section 232, subdivision (a) (7) of
the California Civil Code.47 The mother's contact with Lynna had
been minimal and there was little evidence showing the mother's
affection and concern for the minor; she had never been taken to
the mother's house. There was evidence that Lynna had developed strong ties with her guardians and that she considered them
her family. The trial court found that placing her with the mother
would be detrimental to the child and that the mother was likely
to fail in maintaining an adequate parental relationship and continuous contact with the child. On these findings the trial court
granted the guardians' petition. The mother appealed claiming as
error: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence to support the judg46. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 15 Cal. 3d 942, 951, 544 P.2d 941, 950, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 904 (1976). In this case two children, ages 16 and 19, of divorced parents
sued their father for past child support and for misappropriation of the income
from a testamentary trust established by their paternal grandfather. The mother
had obtained an interlocutory divorce decree 14 years earlier which had incorpo_rat-ed the terms of a property settlement involving the trust property. The children argued that the interlocutory and final divorce judgments should not be
binding on them because they were not parties to the action. The court held that
the mother was entrusted with the care and custody of the children and was a
proper representative of their interests.
47. Civil Code Section 232 provides:
(a) An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under
the age of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or
both of his parents when such person comes within any of the following
descriptions:
(7) Who has been cared for in one or more foster homes under the supervision of the juvenile court, the county welfare department . . . for two or
more consecutive years, providing that the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that return of the child to his parent or parents would be
detrimental to the child and that the parent or parents have failed during
such period, and are likely to fail in the future, to do the following:
(i) Provide a home for the child;
(ii) Provide care and control for the child, and
(iii) Maintain an adequate parental relationship with the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1979).
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ment 48 and (2) the failure of the court to consider less drastic al49
ternatives.
The appellate court noted that the judgment was based on Civil
Code section 232, subdivision (a) (7)50 and that Civil Code section
460051 was also applicable. It also noted that its duty was to determine whether there existed substantial evidence to support the
52
conclusion of the trier of fact.
The mother claimed that Lynna had not been cared for in a foster home for two or more consecutive years as required by Civil
Code section 232, subdivision (a) (7) because the order appointing
the foster parents as guardians of Lynna had terminated their status as foster parents. The appellate court cited no cases in support of the mother's contention and determined that a foster
parent can fulfill dual roles: those of foster parent and of guardian.

53

The mother next claimed that the evidence was insufficient to
support the trial court's finding that placement of Lynna with her
natural mother would be detrimental to the child. The appellate
court noted that while the termination of a parent-child relationship is a "drastic remedy which should be resorted to only in extreme cases. ....
54 the protection of the child is its primary
48. In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 696, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (1979).
49. Id. at 701-02, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
50. Id. at 695, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62. See note 1 supra.
51. The pertinent parts of Civil Code section 4600 are as follows:
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the
court may, during the pendency of the proceeding, or at any time thereafter, make such order for the custody of such child during his minority as
may seem necessary or proper. . . custody should be awarded in the following order of preference:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment.
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it must make
a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the
child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests
of the child ....
CAL. CiV. CODE § 4600 (West 1970).
This section calls for attention to be focused on the detriment to the child
rather than parental unfitness. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114
Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
52. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 694, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
53. Id. at 696, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
54. Id. at 699, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579

concern.5 5 The court held, in considering what was best for the
child, that the trial court had substantial evidence on which to
base its findings that it would be detrimental to return Lynna to
her mother, and to thereby sever her relationship with the foster
56
parents.
The mother's last contention was that the trial court failed to
consider less drastic alternatives. The appellate court acknowledged that it had recently reiterated the principal advanced by
the mother. The principal being that "before state action may be
undertaken to involuntarily terminate the natural relationship of
parent and child, less drastic alternatives, such as provision for
child protection services, must first be explored." 57 The court
stated that since the mother had not requested a finding on the
issue, none was made, but held there was substantial evidence to
support the implied findings that services were considered and offered and that additional efforts at reunification would be unproductive.
7. IN RE. NICOLE B.
93 Cal. App. 3d. 874, 155 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1979)
Nicole B. was declared to be a minor falling within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision
(d)58 which states that a minor may be adjudged to be a dependent child of the court when the child's home is determined unfit
by reason of physical abuse by his parents or any other person
having custody over him. The minor was placed in the home of
her mother and under the supervision of the county department
of welfare. A male friend of the mother had been living with the
mother and child for three months. Nicole had been badly beaten
P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978) (insufficient evidence of cruelty and neglect); In
re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1974) (where the mother was no
longer incarcerated and was in a position to provide a normal home for her children, she could not be deprived of custody)).
55. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 698-99, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 698, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing In re Marcos S., 73 Cal. App. 3d 768,
140 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977) (father convicted of manslaugher of his wife, was in
prison, and had not supported or communicated with his minor child)).
57. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 698-99, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing In re Heidi T., 87 Cal.
App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1979)).
58. Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(d), in pertinent part reads as
follows:

Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty,
depravity, or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or
other person in whose custody or care he is.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (West Supp. 1979).
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by the friend, and such abuse was of the type contemplated by
section 300 (d). The mother alleged no knowledge of the physical
abuse and the male friend no longer resided with the mother and
was not allowed to come about the home. The mother claimed
that the facts were not sufficient to support the court's assumption of jurisdiction.
The appellate court first noted that the welfare of the child was
its paramount concern. 59 The court then stated that the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the lower court's
ruling and that the facts supported the lower court's determina60
tion that the home was unfit.
"The court's involvement in wardship matters is not necessarily
based on a parent's wrongdoing." 61 In assuming jurisdiction in
this case, the court was not examining the fitness of the mother.
Section 300 (d) calls for the investigation of any person having
custody or care over the minor who causes the home to be an unfit place for the minor. Thus, subdivision (d) gives the court jurisdication where a child is physically abused by a person who has
custody of that child.62
The appellate court found the physical abuse to the minor to be
substantial and stated that it "cannot close its eyes to this sort of
extreme abuse."6 3 The court held that there was sufficient evidence to exercise jurisdiction and to adjudge the minor to be a
ward of the court. It noted the fact that there was nothing in the
record to indicate that the male friend would not return, and couthat the
pled with his close association with the mother, indicated
64
child was still in danger if allowed to stay in the home.
59. 93 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. 916, 918 (1979) (citing In re Raya, 255
Cal. App. 2d 260, 264, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1967). See also In re Florence, 47 Cal.
2d 25, 300 P.2d 825 (1956); CAL. WELF.& INST. Code § 202 (West Supp. 1979).
60. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918 (citing In re Robert P., 61 Cal.
App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976); In re Luwanna S., 31 Cal. App. 3d 112, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1973)).
61. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918. The court also stated that
"[tihe authority of the court to assume jurisdiction is based on a determination
that one of these apparent exigent circumstances exists, indicating the minor may
be in need of assistance." Id. The court was referring to the circumstances contained in CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1979).
62. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 882, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
63. Id. at 879, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
64. Id. at 882, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 920.

B.
95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979)
8.

IN RE LA SHONDA

The Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services
(DPSS) filed a dependancy petition arising out of the physical
abuse of a two month old girl by her unmarried mother. The trial
court dismissed the petition with prejudice and gave custody to
the father, who lived apart from the mother.
At issue was whether a child can be removed from the home of
the unfit parent at the adjudication hearing without prejudicing
the other parent's right to gain custody of the child on a sufficient
65
showing that he or she is capable of providing parental care.
The Second District Court of Appeal found that the child can be
removed from the parent with custody and the other parent can
be given custody upon a showing of capacity. With respect to this
case, the trialcourt erred in finding that the father made such
showing. 66
In reversing the order, the court relied on In re Adele L.67 That
court upheld the adjudication of dependency in Adele L. on the
same grounds that apply in La Shonda; the minor's parents do
not share the same home. 68
The court concluded that where a minor had been neglected or
abused by either parent, there is a judicial finding that the minor
is a person described by section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.69 Thus, even though the father lived apart from the
mother, it was still necessary to make a "sufficient showing that
he or she is capable of exercising proper and effective parental
care."70 There was no such showing 7l on behalf of the father, con65. In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 597, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (1979).
66. Id. at 600, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
67. Id. at 599, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 283 (citing In re Adele L., 267 Cal. App. 2d 397, 73
Cal. Rptr. 76 (1968)).
68. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 599, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
69. Id. at 600, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 284. The pertinent provisions of section 300 are:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which
may adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
(a) who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and
has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise
or capable of exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guardian
actually exercising such care or control.
(d) whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty,
depravity, or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or
other person in whose custody or care he is.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1979).
70. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
71. The legislature has added sections 355.1, 355.2, 355.3 and 355.4 to the Welfare and Institutions Code. These sections create presumptions as to the need of
proper and effective parental care. These sections provide as follows:
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sequently the lower court erred in giving custody to the father.
9. lIv RE GEOFFREY G.
98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1979)
The trial court ordered that Geoffrey be declared free from the
custody and control of his natural father under the provision of
Civil Code section 232.72 His father was serving a prison sentence
for voluntary manslaughter arising out of the homicide of the
boy's mother.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the contention that
parental custody would not be detrimental to the child. 73 The
trial court found the father was an unfit parent not simply because he had committed a homicide, but also on the basis of the
violent nature of the felony. 74 "Such a statement is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Civil Code section 460075 which section does not specify any particular form for findings thereun§ 355.1 (West Supp. 1979). Presumption as to
need of proper and effective parental care.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.2 (West Supp. 1979). Presumption of unfit
home by reason of neglect of the minor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355.3 (West Supp. 1979). Presumption of unfit
home by reason of cruelty to the minor.
CAL. WEIF. & INST. CODE § 355.4 (West Supp. 1979). Presumption of unfit
home by reason of physical abuse to the minor72. Civil Code section 232 provides in pertinent part:
An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under the
age of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or
both of his parents when such person comes within any of the following
descriptions:
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

(4) Whose parent or parents are convicted of a felony, if the facts of the
crime of which such parent or parents were convicted are of such nature
as to prove the unfitness of such parent or parents to have the future custody and control of the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1979).

73. In re Geoffrey G., 98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 420, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460, 464 (1979).
74. Id. at 421, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
75. Civil Code § 4600 states:
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child,
the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time
thereafter, make such order for the custody of such child during his minority as may seem necessary or proper. If a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody,
the court shall consider and give due weight to his wishes in making an
award of custody or modification thereof. Custody should be awarded in
the following order of preference:
(a) To either parent according to the best interests of the child.
(b) To the person or persons in whose home the child has been living in a
wholesome and stable environment.
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der." 76

Next the court considered whether the state should have followed less drastic alternatives. The court of appeal determined
that the only alternative was to place Geofrey with his grandparents. "It could not be productive of good to take Geoffrey from his
grandparents, the only parents he knew, and place him with third
parties. '77 The court ruled out any future attempt at reunification
because the court already found the father was "unfit to have the
78
future custody and control."
II. SENTENCING
10.

IN RE HARM R.

88 Cal. App. 3d 438, 152 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1979)
A minor had originally been made a ward of the juvenile court
on his admission of trespassing and committing a curfew violation. He was placed in several private open institutions but had
run away from each of them. However, during the three year period covering these placements, he spent 191 days in the open facilities and 145 days in juvenile hall, where he was detained
between runaways. The juvenile court judge continued the minor
as a ward of the court and released him to his mother on the condition that he remain with her.
The minor argued that the juvenile court had lost jurisdiction
over him, since he had spent more time in custody than the maximum term of imprisonment for an adult charged with his original
offense.
The appellate court held that the juvenile court still had jurisdiction over the minor.79 The reasoning was that section 726 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code,80 which limits the time a minor may be held in physical confinement to the maximum period
(c) To any other person or persons deemed by the court to be suitable
and able to provide adequate and proper care and guidance for the child.
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other than a parent, without the consent of parents, it must make a
finding that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the
child and the award to a nonparent is required to serve the best interests
of the child ....
CAL.CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1970).

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

98 Cal. App. 3d at 422, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
Id.
Id.
In re Harm R., 88 Cal. App. 3d 438, 442, 152 Cal. Rptr. 167, 169 (1979).
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 reads in pertinent part:
In any case in which the minor is removed from the physical custody of
his parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held
in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the of-
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imposable on an adult for the same offense, was not applicable to
the case at bar because the placement of minors in open institutions does not come under the statute's definition of physical confinement. 81
The court then addressed itself to the issue of credit for time already served. The court declined to comment on the controversy
surrounding Penal Code section 2900.5 and proceeded directly to
section 726 and 602. The court held:
Section 726 provides that when a minor is removed from the custody of
his parents as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to section
602 (the instant case), a minor may not be held in a physical confinement
for longer than the underlying crime and physical confinement expressly
includes juvenile hall. Thus, the 145 days in juvenile hall must be credited
against the total time the minor may be held within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. Thus, while the juvenile court has not lost jurisdiction of
the minor, he may not be committed to a juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp,
foster8 2camp or the CYA for longer than 35 days, i.e., 180 days minus 145
days.

11. IN RE CARRIE W.
89 Cal. App. 3d 642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1979)
A juvenile commitment petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 60283 charged sixteen-year-old Carrie W. with
placing numerous unauthorized long distance telephone calls
while she was residing at a home for unwed mothers.
The trial court ordered the juvenile committed to the Youth Aufense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West Supp. 1979).
81. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 442, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 169. Welfare and Institutions Code
section 726 states in pertinent part:
Physical confinement means placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp,
forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any
institution operated by the Youth Authority.
The court held that the minor's placement did not come within the plain language of this statute, but rather the placements were all under section 727, subdivision (1) (b) which provides:
Some association, society, or corporation embracing within its objects
the purpose of caring for such minors ....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West Supp. 1979).
82. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 445, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
83. CA. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1972). Any person under the age
of 18 years who violates any law of this state or of the United States or
any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime or who,
after having been found by the juvenile court to be a person described by
Section 601, fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court, is within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to
be a ward of the court.
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thority for a maximum term of three years even though Carrie W.
had previously been involved in only mildly delinquent behavior.
The sole issue considered by the court of appeal was whether
the commitment order was inconsistent with the general purposes of the juvenile court law.
The court of appeal reversed that part of the judgment ordering
defendant committed to the Youth Authority. The general purpose of the juvenile court law is to rehabilitate and treat, not to
punish. 84 The court stated, "Commitments to the California
Youth Authority are made only in the most serious cases and
only after all else has failed."85 Carrie does not fit within this category.8 6 Carrie had not been involved in any aggressive, destructive, or assaultive conduct. "The commitment to CYA was
unnecessary to protect the public against such comparatively in87
nocuous activity."
The court concluded that commitment to the CYA cannot be
justified on the existence of a defiant, recalcitrant attitude.8 8
12. IN RE MAURICE S.
90 Cal. App. 3d 190, 153 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979)
The juvenile court committed Maurice S. to the California
Youth Authority upon findings "that he took personal property
from the possession and immediate presence of a victim ... and
that he escaped from juvenile hall."89 The judge denied Maurice
credit against his term of confinement for thirty-seven days actually spent in custody and eighteen days good time credit. Maurice
argued that it was a denial of equal protection to withhold from a
juvenile offender the benefit of provisions which have the effect of
shortening the actual period of confinement of adult offenders.
Maurice contended that he was entitled to credit by citing as
authority Penal Code section 2900.590 which allows credit for time
84. In re Michael R., 73 Cal. App. 3d 327, 333-34, 140 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720 (1977).
85. THOMPSON, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT DESKBOOK, § 9.15 (2d ed. 1978).
86. The court lists several "inappropriate cases" for commitment, including
(1) youths who are dependant or primarily placement problems; (2) unsophisticated, mildly delinquent youth; In re Aline, 14 Cal. 3d 557, 564-65, 536 P.2d 65, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 816, 821 (1975).
87. In re Carrie W., 89 Cal. App. 3d 642, 647, 152 Cal. Rptr. 690, 693-94 (1979).
88. Id. at 648, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
89. In re Maurice S., 90 Cal. App. 3d 190, 192, 153 Cal. Rptr. 317, 318 (1979).
90. Section 2900.5 reads in pertinent part:
In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict,
when the defendant has been in custody, . . . all days of custody of the
defendant, including days served as a condition or probation in compliance with a court order ... shall be credited upon his term of imprisonment ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5 (West Supp. 1979).
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spent prior to the commencement of sentence. Maurice's stated
term of confinement was thirty-six months at the California
Youth Authority. An adult would also be sentenced to confinement for up to thirty-six months for the same offense. However,
the adult would be allowed precommitment credits 9' while Maurice was not, therefore, Maurice claimed denial of equal protection.
The court of appeal relied heavily on People v. Olivas92 and
adopted its rationale that there is no justification for differences
in the potential duration of incarceration between youthful and
adult offenders. The court stated:
We conclude, on the authority of Olivas, that Youth Authority confinement of juveniles and Adult Authority confinement of adult prisoners
share for the purposes of equal protection analysis a common purpose of
punishment. No basis has been found for distinguishing between Youth
Authority9 inmates
and adult prisoners in regard to credit for time in con3
finement.

Thus, the court held that it was a denial of equal protection to
withhold from a juvenile offender the benefit of provisions which
have the effect of shortening the actual period of confinement of
94
adult offenders.
13. IN RE JAMES V.
90 Cal. App. 3d 300, 153 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1979)
James, a seventeen-year-old, was committed to the Youth Authority as a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602.95 He had molested an eleven-year-old girl and
91. Id., See In re Leonard R., 76 Cal. App. 3d 100, 103, 142 Cal. Rptr. 632, 634
(1977).
92. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).
In this case the defendant, age 19 at the time of arrest, was tried and convicted as an adult of a misdemeanor assault. He was committed to the
California Youth Authority (CYA). The court held that the time spent at
CYA could not exceed the maximum term which could have been imposed had the defendant been sentenced to county jail. Any excessive
confinement would violate the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the law. The court stated that neither the state's interest in rehabilitating youthful offenders, nor any other conceivable interest could
constitute a compelling interest so as to justify the difference in maximum
terms of confinement.
93. 90 Cal. App. 3d 190, 194, 153 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319 (1979).
94. Id.
95. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 defines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in matters involving juvenile offenders. This section provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
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compelled a seven-year-old girl to orally copulate.
The court of appeal considered whether commitment to the

Youth Authority was an abuse of discretion. The minor was committed for the maximum confinement, which was four years for
violation of Penal Code Section 288,96 whereas an adult convicted
of that statute could be sentenced to four years only if the court
97
made a finding of aggravating circumstances.
The court held that commitment to the Youth Authority "does
not determine the amount of time which appellant must serve in
custody or on parole. The Youth Authority will do that."98 The
Court further pointed out that "[ilf the Youth Authority should
hold appellant beyond the established limit, there is a convenient
judicial remedy."99

14.

IN RE RICHARD W.

91 Cal. App. 3d 960, 155 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1979)
Richard W. was found by a juvenile court to have committed
two counts of burglary. "The court made a specific finding that
the public should be protected from the minor pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, subdivision (b)."100 At a
dispositional hearing, Richard was committed to the Youth Authority for a maximum period of six years and four months. This
case raised several questions.
1. Was Richard denied his right to a fair and impartial hearing
before an unbiased judge because the trial court previously accepted the admission of the other minor who had been with Richard the night of the burglary?
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1970) provides the punishment for acts of
perversion and oral copulation.
97. The contention raised by James V. brings up the challenge of whether
youths should be treated differently from adult criminals. Two court of appeal
cases, In re Eric J., 86 Cal. App. 3d 573, 150 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) and In re Dennis
C., 86 Cal. App. 3d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1978) have been granted a hearing by the
supreme court and are contained in this compendium.
98. In re James V., 90 Cal. App. 3d 306, 308, 153 Cal. Rptr. 334, 338 (1979).
99. Id.
100. In re Richard W., 91 Cal. App. 3d 960, 969, 155 Cal. Rptr. 11, 18 (1979); Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 (b) provides:
The purpose of this chapter also includes the protection of the public from
the consequences of criminal activity, and to such purpose probation officers, peace officers, and juvenile courts shall take into account such protection of the public in their determinations under this chapter.
CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE § 202(b) (West Supp. 1979).
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The appellate court noted that a juvenile is entitled to a trial by
a judge who is detached, fair and impartial.' 0 ' In the instant case,
the court held that the minor had failed to affirmatively show
prejudice as required in order to receive a new trial.102 The court
also stated that "[a] judge is not disqualified to try a case merely
because he previously, in a separate proceeding, heard a case of a
coparticipant or passed on the application of a codefendant for
probation.'0 3 The court held that the record did not indicate that
any statement of the minor in the other action was considered by
the juvenile court in deciding Richard's case and that there was
substantial evidence indicating that Richard had participated in
04
the burglaries.
2. Was the out-of-court field identification in the patrol car a
few minutes after the minors were observed impermissibly suggestive and was Richard entitled to counsel at this stage?
A witness to the incident identified Richard while he was sitting
in the back of a patrol car shortly after the occurence of the incident. Richard asserted that the identification was inadmissible
because the circumstances of the identification were impermissibly suggestive in that it showed only the two minors handcuffed
inside a police car.1 05 The appellate court held that the law favors
field identification measures when in close proximity in time and
place to the scene of the crime. 106 The rationale for this is that
immediate knowledge of whether the correct suspect has been apprehended is of primary importance to society and the suspect
himself. 0 7 The court also held that because field identifications
101. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 967, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See also In re Richardson, 251
Cal. App. 2d 222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1967). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
102. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 968, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See also People v. Beaumaster,
17 Cal. App. 3d 996, 95 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1971).
103. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 968, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 769-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
The assertion was based on People v. Sandoval, 70 Cal. App. 3d 73, 138 Cal. Rptr.
609 (1977), which stated the proposition that a "single person showup" should not
be used without a compelling reason. The appellate court in the case at bar noted
that Sandoval did not involve a field identification and that the rationale of cases
upholding field identifications justifies single person showups provided the procedures used do not give rise to impermissable suggestions.
106. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 970, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 18. See also People v. Craig, 86 Cal.
App. 3d 905, 150 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1978); People v. Colgain, 276 Cal. App. 2d 118, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 659 (1969).
107. See People v. Anthony, 7 Cal. App. 3d 751, 764-65, 86 Cal. Rptr. 767, 776
(1970).
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are of great reliability and because of the practical impossibility
of representation by counsel at an immediate field identification,
the right to counsel was not required for a field identification.108
3. Did the court properly aggregate Richard's terms of commitment on multiple petitions by giving him adequate notice that the
prior charges would be used to compute the commitment?
Richard contended that previously adjudicated offenses may
not be utilized in setting the maximum period of physical confinement. The social worker's report recommended that Richard's
commitment include time for previously sustained violations. His
counsel received and reviewed this report but Richard claimed
such notice was inadequate to give timely notice of the "possible
consequences."10 9
Sections 656110 and 700 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,
when read together, mandate notice be given to the minor of possible consequences, including the maximum period of physical
confinement. Although it was error for the juvenile court not to
advise Richard of such possible consequences, no prejudice was
shown.
The appellate court held that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 726111 authorizes aggregating periods of confinement attributable to previously sustained petitions." 2 However, the failure to file a supplemental petition, as required by section 777,113
108. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 971, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
109. Id. at 975, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 22; Richard relies on section 700 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code which provides in pertinent part:
At the beginning of the hearing on a petition filed pursuant to Article at 16
(commencing with Section 650) of this chapter, the judge or clerk shall
first read the petition to those present and upon request of the minor
upon whose behalf the petition has been brought or upon the request of
any parent, relative or guardian, the judge shall explain any term of allegation contained therein and the nature of the hearing, its procedures, and
possible consequences....
700 (West Supp. 1979).
110. Welfare and Institutions Code § 656 reads in pertinent part:
A petition to commence proceedings in the juvenile court to declare a minor a ward of the court shall be verified and must contain:
(c) The code section or sections and subdivision or subdivisions under
which the proceedings are instituted.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 656 (West Supp. 1979).
111. Section 726 provides in pertinent part:
...If the court elects to aggregate the period of physical confinement on
multiple counts, or multiple petitions, including previously sustained petitions adjudging the minor a ward within Section 602, the "maximum term
or imprisonment" shall be specified in accordance with subdivision (a) of
Section 1170.1 of the Penal Code.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1979).

112. 91 Cal. App. at 975, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
113. Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 provides in pertinent part:
An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor
from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative or friend and di-
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required reversal of the holding for the maximum period of confinement insofar as it utilizes periods from previously sustained
petitions to aggregate the term beyond that specified for new offenses. The court held that in the absence of a supplemental petition under section 777 to formally bring before the court the
ineffectiveness of the previous dispositions in light of the new offense: "the court is limited to fixing a maximum period of confinement based on the new offenses."" 4 It is implicit that if a
supplemental petition for modification is not filed under section
777, the minor's entire record of petitions adjudicated as true may
be utilized in determining an appropriate disposition for the most
recent offense, but not in aggregating the period of confinement.
The court stated that to hold otherwise; "would lead to the remarkable conclusion that a minor who comes before the court
charged with a misdemeanor or with a 90-day or six-month period
of confinement, but having previously adjudicated felony violations, being exposed to the potential of multiple years in confinement without previous notice until at or shortly before the
dispositional hearing."115
15. IN RE ROBERT S.
92 Cal. App. 3d 355, 154 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1979)
Robert was a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.116 The juvenile court had sustained a petirecting placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private institution
or commitment to a county or commitment to a county institution, or an
order changing or modifying a previous order by directing commitment to

the Youth Authority shall be made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.
(a) The supplemental petition shall be filed by the probation officer,
where a minor has been declared a ward of the court under Section 601,
and by the prosecuting attorney at the request of the probation officer
where a minor has been declared a ward under Section 602, in the original
matter and shall contain a concise statement of the previous disposition
has not been effective in the rehabilitation or protection of the minor. ...
CAL. WELF, & INST. CODE § 777 (West Supp. 1979).
114. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 978, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
115. Id. at 979, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
116. Section 602 states:
Any person who isunder the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
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tion on two counts of receiving stolen property. A few months
later, a juvenile commitment petition charged Robert with two
misdemeanor counts of tampering with a vehicle 17 and the petition was sustained. The trial court fixed the term of commitment
at three years and eight months respectively on the two previous
findings of receiving stolen property and at six months for each of
the two counts of vehicle tampering. Robert appealed contending
that the court erred in considering previously sustained section
602 petitions in setting the maximum permissible term of confinement under the CYA commitment. The question presented is
whether for purposes of fixing a maximum period of physical confinement, the court may consider previously sustained petitions.
Robert contended that the juvenile court was not authorized to
consider previously sustained 602 petitions in setting the maximum period of physical confinement and relied on section 726118
of the Welfare and Institutions Code as support. The appellate
court disagreed with the contention by stating that section 726
contemplates "that previously sustained section 602 petitions may
constitute the offense or offenses which brought or continued the
minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and that the
maximum term of physical confinement may therefore be determined with reference to such previously sustained petitions." 119
Robert then contended that his due process rights were violated
because the court failed to inform him of its intention to take his
prior records into account in determining the maximum term of
confinement. The appellate court agreed with this contention.
The court held that one must be given a meaningful opportunity
to be heard regarding the use of past sustained petitions to increase the maximum allowable period of confinement. 120 In this
case, such meaningful opportunity was not afforded the minor.

16.

IN RE ISSAC

G.

93 Cal. App. 3d 917, 156 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1979)
The juvenile court found that Issac G. came within the provi117. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 10852 (West 1971).
118. Section 726(c) provides in relevant part:
In any case in which the minor is removed from the physical custody of
his parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held
in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense
or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdictionof
the juvenile court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
119. In re Robert S., 92 Cal. App. 3d 355, 154 Cal. Rptr. 832, (1979).
120. Id. at 362, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 836; See also In re Aaron, 70 Cal. App. 3d 931, 139
Cal. Rptr. 258 (1977).
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sions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because of his
commission of two burglary offenses. The referee found that one
burglary was in the second degree and committed the minor to
the Youth Authority for a period of confinement not to exceed
three years. The other burglary was found to be a misdemeanor
and its one year confinement was to be served concurrently with
that for the other offense. Issac G. appealed contending that it
was a denial of equal protection for a minor adjudged a ward of
the juvenile court to be subject to the longest of the three time
periods set forth in the Determinate Sentencing Act, without a
showing of aggravated circumstances121 as is required for the imposition of such a term on an adult.
The court held that the difference was not a violation of equal
protection because a juvenile processed as a juvenile in the juvenile court and confined to a Youth Authority is not similarly situated to an adult in criminal court sentenced to state prison. 22 A
minor under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law within the juvenile law system may be released earlier than the outside limits of
his confinement if he becomes rehabilitated. Thus, the purpose of
the juvenile system is rehabilitation. The Determinate Sentencing Act however, states in specific terms that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. 23 The court concluded that
the different purposes of the adult Determinate Sentencing Act
and of the indeterminate juvenile procedure prohibit the "facile"
124
equal protection analysis for which the minor contended.
121. Penal Code section 1170, subd. (b) provides in pertinent part:
When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall order imposition of the middle
term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the
crime ....
In determining whether there are circumstances that justify
imposition of the upper or lower term, the court may consider . . . statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the
defendant....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170, subd. (b) (West Supp. 1979).
122. In re Issac G., 93 Cal. App. 3d 917, 919, 156 Cal. Rptr. 123, 124, (1979). The
court's holding was a direct response to the holding of In re Eric. J., _ Cal. App.
3d _, 150 Cal. Rptr. 299, 304, (1978), which held that a juvenile committed to the
Youth Authority is similarly situated to an adult in criminal court sentenced to
state prison.
123. The California Penal Code section 1170 (a) (1) states in pertinent part:
The legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
124. In re Issac G., 93 Cal. App. 3d 917, 921, 156 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1979).
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17.

IN RE JOHN

R.

94 Cal. App. 3d 566, 155 Cal Rptr. 78 (1979)
John R. was involved in a fight involving several other boys.
The minor was found to have committed assault. The minor was
declared a ward and placed on probation. The court did not specify the length of the probation. John asserted that his probation
could theoretically "continue as long as the juvenile court had jurisdiction, that is, to age 21 in this case August 4, 1981."125 The
disposition was announced on June 30, 1978, therefore jurisdiction
could continue for slightly over three years. The minor contended
that he was deprived of equal protection126 in that an adult convicted of a misdemeanor assault could be placed on probation for
27
no more than three years if the court expressly so provided,1
and only for six months if the court did not specify a time period.128
The court of appeal concluded that it was reasonable to provide
a longer period of probation for juveniles than for adults because
a minor's attitudes may be molded permanently for the better,
given a sufficient period of time under the beneficial influence of
the probation officer, whereas an adult's attitudes may already be
well formed and will respond to or fail on probation within a short
time. 129 This greater potential for rehabilitation of minors justifies the disparity.
18.

PEOPLE V. CARL B.

24 Cal. 3d 212, 594 P.2d 14, 155 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1979)
A minor, 17 years of age, was charged with robbery and assault
with a deadly weapon. The minor was found not a fit and proper
subject to dealt with under the Juvenile Court Law.13 0 Under
adult criminal proceedings, the minor plead guilty to the robbery
charge. The California Youth Authority (CYA), following a
ninety day commitment, filed its own report to the court finding
125. In re John R., 92 Cal. App. 3d 566, 568, 155 Cal. Rptr. 78, 79 (1979). Welfare
and Institutions Code § 607 (a) states in pertinent part: "(a) The court may retain
jurisdiction over any person who is found to be a ward or dependent child of the
juvenile court until such ward or dependent child attains the age of 21 years ....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607 (a) (West Supp. 1979).
126. The minor relied on People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 55 (1976), as have many appellants when arguing equal protection. However,
the court is always quick to note that Olivas involved a fundamental liberty interest which required strict scrutiny. This case did not involve a fundamental right
and therefore a lower level of review was properly utilized by the court.
127. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West 1970).
128. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 568, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
129. Id. at 569, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
130. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1979).
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the minor amenable to their programs. The minor's probation officer agreed with the CYA's evaluation. Nevertheless, the court
ordered the minor committed to state prison, reasoning that the
CYA's report offered no assurance of the minor's rehabilitation.
The court also felt that the prison term was appropriate for the
offenses that the minor had committed. The issue presented was
to determine the scope of a sentencing court's discretion, under
section 707.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,131 to accept or
reject the recommendation of the CYA that a minor be committed
to a CYA facility rather than to a state prison.
The California Supreme Court examined section 707.2 and concluded that before the sentencing court may order a minor to
state prison the court must: "(1) remand the minor to YA for its
evaluation and report, (2) read and consider the YA report, and
(3) find that the minor is not a suitable subject for commitment to
YA."132 The court stated that a reasonable reading of section 707.2
does not suggest that the court must accept the CYA's recommen133
dation.
The court examined the purpose of section 707.2 and found it
analogous to Welfare and Institution Code section 707 which determines whether a minor is a fit and proper subject to be dealt
with under Juvenile Court Law. 3 4 Case law was cited holding
that there must be substantial evidence adduced at the hearing,
finding the minor not a fit and proper subject, before the court
may certify him to the superior court for prosecution.l3 5 The
131. Section 707.2 provides that:
Prior to sentence, the court of criminal jurisdiction may remand the minor
to the custody of the California Youth Authority for not to exceed 90 days
for the purpose of evaluation and report concerning his amenability to
training and treatment offered by the Youth Authority. No minor who was
under the age of 18 years when he committed any criminal offense and
who has been found not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law shall be sentenced to the state prison unless he has
first been remanded to the custody of the California Youth Authority for
evaluation and report pursuant to this section and the court finds after
having read and considered the report submitted by the Youth Authority
that the minor is not a suitable subject for commitment to the Youth Authority.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 1979).

132.
(1979).
133.
134.
135.
(1976);

People v. Carl B., 24 Cal. 3d 212, 217, 594 P.2d 14, 19, 155 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192
Id. at 217,
Id. at 218,
People v.
Jimmy H.

594 P.2d at 17, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
594 P.2d at 17, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392
v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 478 P.2d 32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600
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court reasoned that the record in the case at bar had to be examined to determine whether there was substantial evidence to
support the trial court's finding. The court also noted that the
unanimous opinion of the YA and the probation officer must be
given great weight. 136 After a review of the record, it was determined that the trial court failed to give proper weight to the YA
report and recommendation and thus reversed.
The California Supreme Court held that although the trial court
need not follow the YA's recommendations under section 707.2,
the trial court's sentencing discretion under the statute is not absolute.137 There must be substantial evidence to support the trial
court's implied finding of the defendant's unsuitability to training
and treatment offered by the YA. The court concluded that because the business of the YA is to deal with serious offenders and
because a substantial period of confinement for society's protection could have been fulfilled by YA commitment, the trial court
had no legally sufficient ground for rejecting the YA's recommendation.138

19. IN RE ROBERT D.
95 Cal. App. 3d 767, 157 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1979)
A juvenile court referee found that Robert D. had unlawfully
driven another person's vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851.139 Robert was committed to the California Youth Authority for the maximum term of three years. Robert appealed
urging that his motion for suppression of evidence was improperly denied.
Robert was seen driving an automobile around a turn at approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour. A policeman turned on his siren
and a high speed chase ensued. The chase terminated when the
automobile Robert was driving crashed into a fence. The police
officer testified that when he first observed the automobile, he intended only to make a speeding citation: the speed limit on the
road was 55 miles per hour. Hence, Robert contended that the police officer's observations were the product of an illegal detention.
The juvenile court referee found that although the police officer
(1970). See also People v. Allgood, 54 Cal. App. 3d 434, 126 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1976);
People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d 125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1975).
136. 24 Cal. 3d at 218-19, 594 P.2d at 17, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93. Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 709, 478 P.2d 32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970). Expert testimony
that the minor can be treated by facilities available to the juvenile court is entitled
to great weight.
137. 24 Cal. 3d at 218, 594 P.2d at 18, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
138. Id. at 220, 594 P.2d at 18, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
139. Section 10851 pertains to theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851 (West 1971).

1014

[Vol. 4: 983, 19801

Juvenile Law Decision
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

had no lawful right to stop Robert initially, his numerous subsequent illegal acts (speeding, failure to yield to a red light, swerving, and a traffic accident) justified apprehension and detention
0
by the officer. The appellate court cited People v. Prendez,14 as
stating a fundamental rule that "there is no right to a flight from
unlawful arrest . . . ." The court of appeal concluded that while
the initial pursuit may have been an unjustified attempt at detention, Robert had no right to commit the subsequent unlawful
acts.' 4 ' The subsequent acts dissipated any taint caused by the
initial pursuit and thereby provided a lawful basis justifying the
police officer's arrest of Robert.
Robert then contended that he was entitled to twenty-seven
days credit for precommitment time spent at juvenile hall. The
court granted the credit, pursuaded by the reasoning of In re
Harm R. 142 over that of In re Leonard R. 143
Robert's last contention was that his commitment for the "maximum term" was a denial of equal protection of the laws. It was
quickly noted that Robert, as a minor, does not have all of the
rights and obligations as does an adult.'" The appellate court
took notice of the different purposes between juvenile and adult
court. The purpose of the juvenile justice system is rehabilita46
The jution145 while the purpose of adult court is punishment.
being
is
period,
venile, when committed for a maximum
140. 15 Cal. App. 3d 486, 489, 93 Cal. Rptr. 180, 181 (1971). In Prendez police unlawfully entered a motel room. The defendant fled from the room and, while pursued by an officer who had remained outside, dropped some narcotics. The
defendant was arrested and the discarded contraband recovered. The court held
that the defendant's flight dissipated the taint and the officer's recovery and examination of the discarded contraband did not constitute a search and seizure. The
court stated that the test to be utilized in such a situation is whether an independ-

ent, intervening act of the defendant has broken the causal chain between the illegal police conduct and the seizure of evidence.
141. In re Robert D., 95 Cal. App. 3d 767, 772, 157 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 (1979).
142. 88 Cal. App. 3d 438, 152 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1979). The court in this case addressed itself to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 and held that this section mandates that no minor be confined for a period longer than the underlying
crime and that detention in juvenile hall is physical confinement. Therefore, the
court credited the time spent by the minor in juvenile hall.
143. 76 Cal. App. 3d 78, 140 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1977).
144. 76 Cal. App. 3d 100, 142 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1977). The court addressed itself to
Penal Code section 2900.5 and held that this section was not applicable to juvenile
commitments because it concerns convictions and sentencing which do not occur
in juvenile commitments. Hence, credit was denied.
145. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1979).
146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
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committed for an indeterminate period. The maximum term is
only an outside time limit. Once the youth is rehabilitated, he is
released, even if this is well before the time prescribed in the
maximum term. 147 In contrast, an adult sent to prison for the upper term prescribed is committed for that period less any credits.148

The court concluded that the imposition of the "maximum
term" did not violate equal protection of the laws. The court specifically noted:
The youthful offender sent to CYA and the adult sentenced to prison have
only one point in common-the crime committed. The fact of youth, in
and of itself, mandates a differential approach. The whole concept of
equal treatment for juvenile and adults is, has long been regarded as, barbarous. The very thought [sic] of an eight-year-old burglar receiving like
treatment as an adult felon with similar record carries its own refutation.
essential to
The distinctions made are not only rational but 1 absolutely
49
avoid a charge of cruel and inhuman punishment.

20. IN RE JOHNNY G.
96 Cal. App. 3d 289, 158 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1979)
Johnny Wayne G. was arrested for burglary. He admitted to
second degree burglary, and was declared a ward of the court and
ordered placed in a Camp Community Placement Program His
physical confinement to the camp was ordered not to exceed
three years. Since Johnny G. had been in custody since the time
of his arrest, his counsel made a motion pursuant to section
2900.5150 of the Penal Code for credit for the time Johnny had already served while in custody. The court denied the credit and
Johnny claimed that this was a violation of equal protection be51
cause an adult criminal would have been entitled to a credit.1
The court of appeal noted that In re Leonard R. 152 was in direct
contradiction to the contention of appellant. 53 Leonard, a juvenile, was committed to the California Youth Authority upon a
finding that he had participated in a robbery. Leonard asserted
that he was entitled to credit for time spent in juvenile hall during
147. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1766(a), (c)-(f) (West Supp. 1979).
148. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2930-2931 (West Supp. 1979).
149. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
150. Penal Code § 2900.5 reads in pertinent part that "In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in
custody,. . . all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order ... shall be credited upon his
" CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5 (West Supp. 1979).
term of imprisonment ....
151. Id.
152. 76 Cal. App. 3d 100, 142 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1977).
153. In re Johnny G., 96 Cal. App. 3d 289, 291, 158 Cal. Rptr. 68, 69 (1979) (emphasis added).
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the pendency of the juvenile court proceedings.
court stated:

The Leonard

Penal Code section 2900.5 by its very terms is not applicable to juvenile
commitments. The statute refers to felony and misdemeanor convictions
and provides for precommitment custody time to be credited only against
the defendant's sentence. A declaration of wardship is not a 'conviction'
15 4
and a dispositional order of the juvenile court is not a "sentence.,

The Leonard court also rejected an equal protection argument
55
based on People v. Olivas,1
on the ground that Olivas didn't apply to juvenile court commitments. 5 6 The Leonard court noted:
The distinction between juveniles and adults which permits different legislative treatment in terms of confinement and disposition is to be found
in the fundamental and conceptual difference between criminal prosecution and juvenile proceedings. Such a distinction is not arbitrary and
15 7
clearly bears a substantial relation to a legitimate legislative objective.
58
on
The Leonard court also distinguished People v. SandovalX
59
the basis of the juvenile/adult court dichotomy.1 In Sandoval,
the minor was tried as an adult in adult court on an original offense. The minor served one year in jail and was placed on probation. Upon a subsequent offense, the minor was sentenced to the
California Youth Authority and was given credit for the one year
in jail and 90 days spent in custody while awaiting trial and revocation proceedings.
The Johnny G. court next turned its attention to In re Maurice
S.160 which was in direct conflict with In re Leonard R.161 The
court found that the holding of Maurice S. was based on the assumption that the length of terms of confinement are the same for
minors and adults for a similar offense and similar sentence. The
court noted that a thirty-six month term under the Determinate
Sentencing Act is quite different from a thirty-six month maximum commitment to the California Youth Authority. The court
stated:

Subject to certain specific credits-e.g., Penal Code section 4019-the
adult is sentenced to prison for a definite time from which any credit
154. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 103-04, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
155. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976).
156. In Olivas, defendant was 19 years of age at the time of arrest and tried as
an adult.
157. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 104-05, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
158. 70 Cal. App. 3d 73, 138 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1977).
159. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The Leonard court reconciles
the allowance of credit in both Sandoval and Olivas since the defendants were
tried as adults.
160. 90 Cal. App. 3d 190, 153 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979).
161. Leonard denied precommitment credit to a juvenile, while Maurice specifically mandated credit.
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under section 1900.5 to which he may be entitled is subtracted-an easy
mathematical problem. In the minor's case, however, the minuend-the
period of confinement from which this credit is to be subtracted-is unknown at the outset of the confinement. When, however, the actual length
way home
of confinement does become known, the minor is already on1 6his
2
and would not know what to do with section 2900.5 credits.

The court reasoned that if the juvenile is confined to the California Youth Authority, he will be released under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1766, subdivision (f)163 whenever the
California Youth Authority is satisfied; "that such discharge is
consistent with the protection of the public."164 If the juvenile is
confined to a camp, he will be released under Welfare and Institutions Code section 778165 if it appears that the best interests of the
child may thereby be promoted. A credit in such a procedure
would be nonsense. Therefore, the court denied the credit and re66
jected the equal protection argument.1
21. IN RE TODD W.
96 Cal. App. 3d 408, 157 Cal. .Rptr. 802 (1979)
A 13-year-old minor admitted the allegations charging him with
auto theft. Todd was committed to the Youth Authority for a
maximum term of three years. In ordering the commitment, the
trial court indicated its concern with protection of the community
and with the minor's need for discipline, remedial education, and
treatment of emotional problems.167 The trial court rejected a
less restrictive and less punitive placement because it was not a
locked, secure facility.
The court of appeal reversed that part of the judgment ordering
commitment to the Youth Authority. The court determined that
162. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 292, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
163. Section 1766, subdivision (f) provides that "When a person has been committed to the authority, it may (f) Discharge him from its control when it is satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the protection of the public." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 1766(f) (West Supp. 1979).
164. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 292, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
165. Section 778 provides in pertinent part:
Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a ward of
the juvenile court or the child himself through a properly appointed
guardian may, upon grounds of change of circumstances or new evidence,
petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a
If it appears that the best
ward of the juvenile court for a hearing ....
interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order or
termination of jurisdiction, the court shall order that a hearing be
held....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 778 (West Supp. 1979).
166. The court ended the case with the following statement that "[tlo use a
tired metaphor just once more: we are being asked to hold that a pruning operation which the Legislature has decreed for apple trees must also be performed for
the benefit of oranges." 96 Cal. App. 3d. at 293, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
167. In re Todd W., 96 Cal. App. 3d 408, 416, 154 Cal. Rptr. 802, 806 (1979).
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commitment to the CYA should only be made in more serious
cases. 1 6 8 Todd's criminal conduct of auto theft falls within the
category of inappropriate cases for commitment, 169 thus the trial
court was not justified in bypassing a less restrictive and less punitive placement just because prior placements were unsuccessful.' 7 0

In light of the general purpose of juvenile commitments expressed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, commitment to the Youth Authority is generally viewed as the final
treatment resource available to the juvenile court. 7 1 Todd had
not reached that stage.
168. Id. at 417, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 807. E.g., In re Carrie W., 89 Cal. App. 3d 642, 152
Cal. Rptr. 690 (1979). The court listed examples of serious offenses: (1) robbery
with great bodily harm coupled with a lengthy history of gang involvement and
several prior violent crimes, In re John H., 21 Cal. 3d 18, 577 P.2d 177, 145 Cal. Rptr.
357 (1978); (2) 22 prior arrests, six of which were violent offenses, coupled with numerous prior ineffective placements, In re Robert W., 68 Cal. App. 3d 705, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 558 (1977); (3) yelling at a teacher and being disruptive in school coupled
with a prior record of grand theft and burglary, In re Zardies B., 64 Cal. App. 3d 11,
134 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1976); (4) criminally sophisticated pattern of delinquent behavior coupled with burglary and drug offenses, In re Willie L., 56 Cal. App. 3d 256, 128
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1976); and (5) two rapes and oral copulation coupled with shoplifting, joy riding and possession of marijuana, In re Clarence B., 37 Cal. App. 3d 676,
112 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1974).
169. CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURE FOR REFERRAL OF
JUVENILE COURT CASES TO THE YoUTH AUTHORrrY (1971), lists several inappropriate cases for commitment including(1) Youth who are dependent or primarily placement problems-'For
these youths in need of a home and peer acceptance, as well as accepting
adults, life in an institution might be totally fulfilling, resulting in an orientation to an institutional existence; (2) unsophisticated,mildly delinquent
youths, 'for whom commingling with serious delinquents who make up
the bulk of the Youth Authority population might result in negative learning experience and serious loss of self-esteem'; and (3) mentally retarded
or mentally disturbed youths, 'for whom the probable benefits of treatment within the mental health system exceed those programs within the
Youth Authority ... .' (emphasis in original).
96 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
170. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
171. The general statutory purpose of juvenile court law can be found in Welfare and Institution Code section 202.
(a) The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court such care and guidance, preferably in his
own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the state; to protect the public
from criminal conduct by minors; to impose on the minor a sense of responsibility for his own acts; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
only when necessary for his welfare or for the safety and protection of the
public; and, when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for
him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
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22. Iv RE RUBEN M.
96 Cal App. 3d 690, 158 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1979)
Ruben M. was charged with malicious mischief while he was on
probation for three previously adjudicated charges of burglary.
The juvenile court declared Ruben M. to be a ward of the court
and committed him to the Youth Authority. There was no petition or hearing filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 777172 which requires a noticed hearing on an order changing a previous order of commitment to the Youth Authority. Even
though it included no petition, the probation report contained a
full and complete recitation of Ruben M.'s prior cases and the minor's past conduct under supervision.
One of the issues the Second District Court of Appeal considered was if a minor is declared a ward of the court, under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602,173 may all the prior cases for
which the minor is presently on probation, be considered in determining the maximum period of confinement. The court held that
"when a new section 602 petition is filed no additional petition
under section 777 is required in order to include the prior cases in
the [aggregate] maximum term of commitment." 7 4 The court
further held that, assuming a petition under section 777 was required, that the minor had received all the protections that a
hearing under 777 would have accorded and "no prejudicial error
nor miscarriage of justice resulted. (Art. VI, § 13, Cal. Const.)."175
which should have been given by his parents. This chapter shall be liberally construed to carry out these purposes.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp. 1979).
172. Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 reads in pertinent part:
An order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor
from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative or friend and directing placement in a foster home, or commitment to a private institution
or commitment to a county institution, or an order changing or modifying
a previous order by directing commitment to the Youth Authority shall be
made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 777 (West Supp. 1979).
173. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 deals with the juvenile court's
jurisdiction involving minors who have violated the law. The section, in its entirety provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
174. In re Ruben M., 96 Cal. App. 3d 690, 698, 158 Cal. Rptr. 197, 201 (1979).
175. Id. The probation report recited at length the prior cases and their status
along with the minor's conduct under supervision. The probation report gave notice based upon the minor's past cases. The minor and his counsel have all the
notice of the facts of the present and past cases and the possible consequences of
a new petition under section 777.
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The court reached this result because of the full and complete
recitation of present and past cases contained in the probation report.
Another issue was whether the fourteenth amendment has
been violated with respect to the equal protection of the law because of the use of the prior charges in determining the sentence
to be imposed. Welfare and Institutions Code section 726176 authorizes a juvenile court to commit a minor adjudged a ward of
the court to a potential physical confinement in Youth Authority
for the longest of the three time periods specified for adults under
paragraph 2 of subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1170.1.177
The period for which Ruben M. was confined was within the legal
limit for which an adult could have been confined under similar
178
circumstances under the Determinate Sentence Law.
The court of appeal also considered commitment of a minor
based on several offenses. "The most serious offense in terms of
length of confinement may be used as a measurement of the basic
term and not as the exclusive of total period for which the minor
79
may be commited."1
The final contentions by Ruben M. were that: (a) he was entitled to credit for predisposition time spent in custody and (b) he
was entitled to good time-work time credit for time spent in camp
confinement. These contentions are now before the California
Supreme Court1 80 and the appellate court expressed no views on
176. Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 reads in pertinent part:
In any case in which the minor is removed from the physical custody of
his parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held
in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1979).
177. Under Penal Code section 1170.1(a), made applicable to juvenile commitments by Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, where the court finds aggravating circumstances, the maximum consecutive term to which an adult can be
sentenced is 3 years for the principle term (either the forgery or the battery) plus
1/3 of the middle term of the subordinate felony (i.e., eight months). The misdemeanor normally would be ordered to be served concurrently with the felony
sentences, although the law is by no means certain on this point. In re Dennis C.,
86 Cal. App. 603, 606 n.2, 150 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357 n.2 (1978). See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.1(a) (West Supp. 1979).
178. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 701-02, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
179. Id. at 702-03, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
180. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979). Other
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the subject.

23. IN RE ERIC J.
25 Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979)
Eric was found to have committed burglary and was declared a
ward of the juvenile court. After the jurisdictional hearing, Eric
was committed to the California Youth Authority for the maximum term of confinement permitted by law. This term of confinement would be less, absent aggravating circumstances, if an adult
or juvenile was convicted in the criminal courts for the identical
unlawful act. Eric, relying on People v. Olivas, 8 1 argued that
Welfare and Institutions Code section 726182 denies him equal
protection of the laws by providing that the maximum term of
confinement for a juvenile is the longest term imposable upon an
adult for the same offense, without the necessity of finding aggravating circumstances justifying imposition of the outside term as
is required in adult criminal procedure by Penal Code section
1170,183

subdivision (b)."184

cases of like interest now pending before the Supreme Court involving adults are
People v. Sage (Crim. 20997) hearing granted May 30, 1979; People v. Brown (Crim.
20998) hearing granted May 30, 1979; In re Davis (Crim. 20999) (Cal. App.) hearing
granted May 30, 1979.
181. 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976). In this case the court
held that the time spent in California Youth Authority could not exceed the maximum term which could have been imposed had the defendant been sentenced to
county jail. Any excessive confinement would violate the constitutional requirement of equal protection of the law.
182. Section 726(c) provides in relevant part:
In any case in which the minor is removed from the physical custody of
his parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held
in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West Supp. 1979).

183. Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part:
When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall order imposition of the middle
term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the
crime. At least four days prior to the time set for imposition of judgment
either party may submit a statement in aggravation or mitigation to dispute facts in the record or the probation officer's report, or to present additional facts. In determining whether there are circumstances that justify
imposition of the upper or lower term, the court may consider the record
in the case, the probation officer's report, other reports including reports
received pursuant to Section 1203.03 and statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1979).
184. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 528, 601 P.2d 549, 551, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 319
(1979).
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The California Supreme Court stated that People v. Olivas held
section 1770 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as violative of
the equal protection clause because it permitted youthful offenders to be committed to the Youth Authority for a term potentially
longer than the maximum jail term which might have been imposed on an adult for the same offense. 185 Under section 1731.5,186
youthful offenders were prosecuted and tried as adults in adult
court.' 87 The situation in Olivas is not present in this case in that
the minor was adjudged under the juvenile court law as a juvenile.
The California Supreme Court noted the disparity in the maximum confinement terms between juvenile court' 8 8 and criminal
court.189 Despite the disparity, the court held that Eric was not
denied equal protection of the laws. 190 Minors and adults are not
similarly situated with respect to their interest in liberty. Because minors are adjudged wards of the juvenile courts and are
committed to the Youth Authority for rehabilitation and adults
convicted in the criminal courts are sentenced to prison for punishment, they are not confined for the same purposes,' 9 ' therefore, section 726 does not deny minors equal protection of the
92
laws.1
Eric also contended that he is entitled to credit for the nineteen
days he was detained in juvenile hall pending adjudication of a
contempt charge and credit for another twenty-seven days that he
was detained pending resolution of a burglary charge. 193 Eric re185. Id. at 529, 601 P.2d at 552, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
186. Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 provides in relevant part that
"[a]fter certification to the Governor as provided in this article a court may commit to the authority any person convicted of a public offense who comes within
subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), or subdivisions (a), (b), and (d), below: (a) Is
found to be less than 21 years of age at the time of apprehension." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1972).
187. 25 Cal. 3d at 529, 601 P.2d at 552, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 320; People v. Olivas, 17
Cal. 3d 236, 242-43, 551 P.2d 375, 379, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 59 (1976).
188. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West Supp. 1979).
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1979).
190. 25 Cal. 3d at 530, 601 P.2d at 553, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
191. Juvenile commitment proceedings are designed for purposes of rehabilitation and treatment, not punishment. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West Supp.
1979); In re Aline D., 14 Cal. 3d 557, 536 P.2d 65, 121 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975). The legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a) (1) (West Supp. 1979).
192. 25 Cal. 3d at 530, 601 P.2d at 553, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
193. Id. at 533, 601 P.2d at 555, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
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lied on section 2900.5 of the Penal Code 9 4 and section 726 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code19 5 as mandating such precommitment credit.
The court investigated the legislative intent behind section
2900.5196 and the specific language of section 726(c). 197 The court
held that in order to carry out the mandate of section 726, the mi198
nor must be given credit for the forty-six days he was detained.
24.

IN RE JEANICE D.

98 Cal. App. 3d 965, 159 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1979)
Jeanice, a minor, was tried as an adult and found guilty of first
degree murder. The sentence was for a term of 25 years to life.199
She contends that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in
sentencing her to state prison without first complying with the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 7072.200 That
section requires the sentencing court to remand a minor to the
Youth Authority for evaluation and a report prior to sentencing
the minor to state prison.201
In deciding the case, the court of appeal examined Welfare and
Institutions Code section 1731.5. The section provides that "a
court may commit to the [Youth Authority] any person convicted
of a public offense who ... [i]s found to be less than 21 years of
age at the time of apprehension [and is] not sentenced to death,
imprisonment for life .... "202
194. Section 2900.5 reads in pertinent part that "[iun plea or by verdict, when
the defendant has been in custody, . . . all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order
CAL. PENAL CODE
... shall be credited upon his term of imprisonment ......
§ 2900.5 (West Supp. 1979).
195. See note 2 infra.
196. 25 Cal. 3d at 534-35, 601 P.2d at 556, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The court considered the comments from the author of § 2900.5 and the amendment at 534-35. The
author stated that the amendment adding the phrase "juvenile detention facility,"
was designed to reverse the interpretation of In re Leonard, 76 Cal. App. 3d 100,
142 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1977), holding § 2900.5 inapplicable to juvenile commitments, so
as to insure that a minor could not be put in jeopardy of serving more time than
the adult counterpart. However, the author also stated that section 2900.5 could be
interpreted as not affecting In re Leonard in that a dispositional order of the juvenile court is not a "sentence."
197. The court noted that the specific language of this section would have expressly excluded precommitment credit if it was the intent of the legislature. 25
Cal. 3d at 536, 601 P.2d at 556-57, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 324-25.
198. Id. at 537-38, 601 P.2d at 558, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
199. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 states in pertinent part: "Every person guilty of
murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life
without possibility of parole, or confinement in the state prison for a term of 25
years to life. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1979).
200. CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE § 707.2 (West Supp. 1979).

201. In re Jeanice D., 98 Cal. App. 3d 965, 967, 159 Cal. Rptr. 788, 789 (1979).
202. CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1972).
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The court had to decide whether a term of 25 years to life constitutes a life term within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions
Code section 1731.5.203
The court relied heavily on People v. Ralph.204 There the California Supreme Court ruled that "for the purposes of the Youth
Authority Act, [a defendant] could not be held to have been 'sentenced to . . . imprisonment for life' unless the sentence prescribed by law carried a minimum or fixed punishment of life
imprisonment." 205 In discussing Penal Code section 190 the court
held it "is clear on [the statute's] face that it establishes an indeterminate sentence of from 25 years to life imprisonment for first
degree murder. Such a sentence obviously does not require im20 6
prisonment for life."
The court went on to say that it is up to the legislature to
amend Penal Code section 190, for without amendment it is nec20 7
essary to refer the minor to the Youth Authority for evaluation.
III. PROCEDURE

25.

IN RE JOHNATHAN S.

88 Cal. App. 3d 468, 151 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1979)
Following an admission by Johnathan S. to the robbery of victims in a single incident, the minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court and committed to the Youth Authority.208 In the
period between the referee's disposition continuing the juvenile
as a ward of the court and ordering the youth to participate in a
work project, there were ex parte contacts between the court and
opposing counsel.
Johnathan S. appeals the judgment ordering him committed to
the California Youth Authority because the ex parte contacts constituted improper conduct on the part of the district attorney and
vitiated the commitment order.
The court denied the appeal without ever considering the impropriety of these ex parte contacts 209 and determined that the
98 Cal. App. 3d at 967, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 789 (emphasis in original).
24 Cal. 2d 575, 150 P.2d 401 (1944).
Id. at 580, 150 P.2d at 403.
98 Cal. App. 3d at 968, 159 Cal. Rptr. 789 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 970, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
In re Johnathan S., 88 Cal. App. 3d 468, 470, 151 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811 (1979).
209. Id. at 472, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 812. ABA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7108(b), holding that unless expressly authorized by law, ex parte contacts be203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
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minor was not prejudiced in this case. The "ex parte contacts
with the judge involved the power to grant a rehearing, not the

exercise of the court's discretion to do so in circumstances where
the judge was certain of his authority."210 The minor was not
prejudiced, since the subsequent disposition was fully and fairly
heard de novo by a judge other than the one who ordered the rehearing.211

26. IN RE RICHARD C.
89 Cal. App. 3d 477, 152 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1979)
Richard C. was charged with various criminal offenses, including carrying a concealed firearm and buying, concealing, and receiving stolen property. Richard was found to be within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the provisions of Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602.212
One of the issues considered was whether the People, as complainant, have a right of direct appeal. The court held that, while
2 13
appeal by the People was precluded, review by writ was proper.
The court was also concerned with the possibility of double jeopardy, which is applicable to juvenile proceedings. 2 14 In the instant
case, because only the jurisdictional hearing took place, there was
no danger of retrial in contravention of the prohibition against
215
double jeopardy.
Therefore, the court held that review by writ is possible if the
trial court acts in excess of jurisdiction and there is no danger of
retrial. 216 The court pointed out that proceeding by writ is not absolute; "it requires a delicate balancing of the complicated considerations of preventing harassment of the accused as against
tween the court and counsel are not allowed, where such contacts deal with the
merits of a pending, contested matter.
210. 88 Cal. App. 3d at 472, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
211. Id. at 471, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
212. In re Richard C., 89 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480, 152 Cal. Rptr. 787, 789 (1979). Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 reads:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
213. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 482, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
214. Id. at 485, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (citing Richard M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.
3d 370, 375, 482 P. 2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971)).
215. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 487, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
216. Id. at 484, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (citing People v. Superior Court (Edmond's)
4 Cal. 3d 605, 483 P.2d 1202, 94 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1971); People v. Superior Court (Brodie) 48 Cal. App. 3d 195, 121 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975); see also Jesse W. v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 576 P.2d 963, 145 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); In re Raymond P., 86 Cal.
App. 3d 797, 150 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1978)).
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correcting possible errors." 217
27. IN RE FRANK F.
90 Cal. App. 3d 383, 153 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1979)
Frank F., while intoxicated, drove a car which collided with the
center divider of a freeway, thereby obstructing traffic. After the
minor fled the scene, a vehicle hit the car head on, killing the
2 18
driver of the second vehicle.
The sole issue which confronted the court on appeal was that
the juvenile court petition should not have proceeded by reference to the vehicular manslaughter statute, 219 but should have
220
been based on the felony drunk driving statute.
The Second District Court of Appeal reiterated that, "ii] n an inquiry whether a special criminal statute supplants a general criminal statute, our prime, if not only, consideration is whether the
Legislature so intended ... ,"221 Finding the legislative intent to
the contrary in this case, the court affirmed the juvenile court's
222
conviction of Frank F. for committing vehicular manslaughter.
217. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 791 (citing People v. Superior Court
(Howard) 69 Cal. 2d 491, 501, 446 P.2d 138, 146, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 338 (1968)). The
Supreme Court in Howard also pointed out that an extraordinary writ should not
be granted where the appeal is one in which the legislature has previously denied
them.
218. In re Frank F., 90 Cal. App. 3d 383, 385, 153 Cal. Rptr. 375, 376 (1979).
219. California Penal Code section 192 provides in pertinent part:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It.
is of three kinds:
3.

In the driving of a vehicle(b)

In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, with
gross negligence; or in commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.

CAL.PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1970).

220. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 376. California Vehicle Code section
23101 provided:
(a) It is unlawful for any person, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or under the combined influence of intoxicating liquor and any
drug, to drive a vehicle upon a highway and when so driving do any act
forbidden by law or neglect any duty imposed by law in the driving of
such vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes death or bodily injury to any person other than himself.
CAL.VEH. CODE § 23101 (West 1979).
221. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
222. Id. at 386-87, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
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28. IN RE OWEN E.
23 Cal. 3d 398, 592 P.2d 720, 154 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1979)
A minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court when it was
found the minor had killed his father. The minor was committed
to the California Youth Authority (CYA) facility. Two years after
the minor's commitment he petitioned the CYA for parole. The
CYA denied the petition because in its view the minor had not
yet accepted the responsibility for his actions resulting in his
commitment and did not fully appreciate his obligations to society. The minor's mother then petitioned the juvenile court to vacate the commitment. The juvenile court examined the same
matters deemed by CYA to necessitate a denial parole and concluded that the minor's rehabilitative needs would best be satisfied if he were released from custody. The court vacated its
original order and placed the minor on probation. Appeal of the
release order was then taken by the director of CYA.223 The issue
presented was whether the juvenile court has superior authority
to reconsider and overrule a discretionary determination made by
the CYA.
The minor contended that the juvenile court's authority to vacate the CYA commitment is derived from Welfare & Institutions
Code section 779.224 This minor argued that the juvenile court
judge under section 779 "need only take CYA determinations into
account, and that it had a right to 'second guess' the CYA."225
The director contended that the juvenile court can set aside a
CYA determination only upon a clear showing of abuse of discre22
tion on the part of the Authority. 6
The California Supreme Court noted that, "the Legislature has
223. In re Owen E., 23 Cal. 3d 398, 400-01, 592 P.2d 720, 720-21, 154 Cal. Rptr. 204,
204-05 (1979).
224. Id. at 402, 592 P.2d at 722, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 206. See also Welfare and Institutions Code section 779 provides in pertinent part:
The court committing a ward to the Youth Authority may thereafter
change, modify, or set aside the order of commitment. Ten days' notice of
the hearing of the application therefor shall be served by United States
mail upon the Director of the Youth Authority. In changing, modifying, or
setting aside such order of commitment, the court shall give due consideration to the effect thereof upon the discipline and parole system of the
Youth Authority or of the correctional school in which the ward may have
been placed by the Youth Authority. Except as in this section provided,
nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to interfere with the system of parole and discharge now or hereafter established by law, or by rule of the
Youth Authority, for the parole and discharge of wards of the juvenile
court committed to the Youth Authority, or with the management of any
school, institution, or facility under the jurisdiction of the Youth Authority.
CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 779 (West 1972).

225. 23 Cal. 3d at 403, 542 P.2d at 724, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
226. Id.
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not clearly defined the circumstances under which a juvenile
court may intervene in a matter concerning the rehabilitative
needs of a ward it has committed to the CYA."227 The court considered the cases of In re Ronald E.,228 Breed v. Superior Court,229
and In re Arthur N.,230 and concluded that section 779 did not
grant authority for a juvenile court to set aside an order committing a ward to CYA merely because its views of the rehabilitative
needs and progress differed from those of the CYA.231
The California Supreme Court held that "a juvenile court may
not act to vacate a proper commitment to the CYA unless it appears the Authority has failed to comply with the law or has
232
abused its discretion in dealing with a ward in its custody."
The court further stated that section 779 does not authorize judicial intervention into the routine parole function of the CYA.

29. IN RE JIMMY M.
93 Cal. App. 3d 369, 155 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1979)
For various violations of the Penal Code, Jimmy M. was found
to be a ward of the court and was committed to the California
Youth Authority. At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings,
which had been consolidated, the probation officer recommended
that Jimmy be committed to a county facility. The juvenile
waived his rights and admitted to the allegations. The juvenile
court did not include in its recital of the minor's rights any reference to the fact that his admission could allow for his commitment to the California Youth Authority; nor was it clear as to
whether the juvenile's attorney informed the minor that such a
commitment was possible. The minor claimed that the court's
failure to inform him of the possible consequences constituted re233
versible error.
227. Id.
228. 19 Cal. 3d 315, 562 P.2d 684, 137 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977). This case dealt with
parole revocation and stated that the juvenile court is not authorized to act essentially in the role of a Youth Authority parole revocation hearing officer.
229. 63 Cal. App. 3d 773, 134 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1976). The court held that the juvenile court is without jurisdiction to release a ward on parole from the CYA.
230. 16 Cal. 3d 226, 545 P.2d 345, 127 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976). The court stated that
once a minor is committed to the CYA, the juvenile court ceases to have direct
supervision and it becomes the proper function of the Authority to determine the
length of its jurisdiction over a ward.
231. 23 Cal. 3d at 406, 592 P.2d at 724, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
232. Id.
233. In re Jimmy M., 93 Cal. App. 3d 369, 372, 155 Cal. Rptr. 534, 535 (1979) (cit-
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The court found that the juvenile court's failure to inform the
juvenile of the possible consequences of his admission was in error.234 However, the court noted that the error did not command
reversal unless the minor could show he was prejudiced
thereby. 235 "The record on appeal, evidenced nothing in this regard" 236 and thus the order was affirmed.
30. IN RE MARY Jo D.
95 Cal. App. 3d 34, 156 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1979)
Mary D. was made a ward of the juvenile court after finding her
guilty of vandalizing property worth less than $1,000. This offense
is considered a misdemeanor which carries a maximum six
months custodial punishment. Mary was placed on probation in
the home of her parents. Mary violated the terms of probation by
leaving home without the consent of her parents. The court found
Mary in criminal contempt and ordered her confined for the maximum term of six months in a rehabilitation facility. 237 The issue
was whether the use of criminal contempt under such circumstances was appropriate.
The appellate court did not question the propriety of the court's
ability to punish one for a violation of probation and to continue
the wardship for the second offense committed. However, the
court did hold that the use of criminal contempt to elevate what
would be a Welfare & Institutions Code section 601238 offense to a
section 602239 offense was inappropriate. 240 The court noted that
before 1976, section 602 included language authorizing jurisdiction
ing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81
Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969). The record must contain on its face direct evidence that the
accused was aware, or made aware, of his rights as well as the nature of the
charge and the consequences of his plea.).
234. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 373, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (1979) (citing In re Ronald E., 19
Cal. 3d 315, 562 P.2d 684, 137 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977). Minor admitted to a charge and
was not advised as to the consequences of such an admission by the court. This
failure was error but was not set aside because it was not deemed prejudicial to
the minor.).
235. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 373, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
236. Id.
237. In re Mary D., 95 Cal. App. 3d 34, 36, 156 Cal. Rptr. 829, 830 (1979).
238. Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 reads in pertinent part: Any
person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually refuses to
obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian, or custodian, or who is beyond the control of such person, or who is
under the age of 18 when he violated any ordinance of any city or county
of this state establishing a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court ....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1979).
239. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 provides: Any person who is
under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of this state or of the
United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining
crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age,
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where there was a prior section 601 finding and a failure "to obey
any lawful order of the juvenile court."24 1 In 1976 the section was
amended 242 to delete this language. 243 The court stated that the
amendment was a clear showing of legislative intent to change
the then existing law. 24 4 The court proclaimed that, "failure to
obey a lawful order of the juvenile court, i.e., a criminal contempt
after a 601 finding, is no longer a part of that section," and therefore, "criminal contempt should not be included as a basis for the
24
section 602 finding." 5
The court went on to note that when the section 602 confinement for the first offense had ended, Mary was being held solely
on section 601 grounds as a runaway. It was the technical violation of the court's order to obey the terms of probation which will
elevate it to make it a more serious offense. The juvenile court
used criminal contempt to contravene legislative intent and at24
tempted to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 6

31.

CRAIG S. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF

Los ANGELES COUNTY

95 Cal. App. 3d 568, 157 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979)
On arraignment in a juvenile court proceeding charging Craig S.
with grand theft, the presiding referee declared that the public
defender, who was already representing the minor on another
matter, was unavailable, so the referee appointed private counsel
to represent him.247 Both the minor and his mother were of the
impression that the public defender who was representing the minor in the first matter would continue to be his lawyer on the
248
grand theft charges.
The public defender had a conflicting appearance in another
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such
person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
240. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 37, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
241. Id.
242. 1976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1071, § 12.
243. The 1976 amendment deleted "or who, after having been found by the juvenile court to be a person described by Section 601, fails to obey any lawful order of
the juvenile court" and inserted thereat "other than an ordinance establishing a
curfew based solely on age."
244. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 37, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 38, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
247. Craig S. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 95 Cal. App. 3d 568, 570, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 286 (1979).
248. Id. at 574, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
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court but informed the court she would be there as soon as possible. The public defender appeared only 35 minutes after the refe249
ree appointed private counsel.
This appeal presented the Second District Court of Appeal with
the narrow issue of abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in refusing to honor the minor's preference for appointment of the
public defender.
A trial court must exercise sound discretion in the appointment
of counsel to represent an indigent defendant. 25 0 "It is generally
recognized that in counties where a public defender's office exists
the court will normally appoint that office to represent the indigent defendant. '25 1 The appointment of private counsel is reserved for situations where there is no public defender, there is a
conflict in representation, or where he otherwise properly refuses
252
to represent the indigent.
Given this standard, the court concluded that the decision to
appoint private counsel to represent the minor, rather than the
253
public defender, constituted an abuse of judicial discretion.
The court cannot avoid appointment of a public defender simply
by calling a case when the public defender is not present. "The
concept of 'unavailability' requires more than the absence of the
public defender at the instant the case is called, and more than an
254
additional delay of some 40 minutes."
249. Id.
250. Id. at 573, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88 (citing Drungo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.
3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1973)).
251. Id. at 572, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
252. Id. Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 987.2 provides:
In any case in which a person, including a person who is a minor, desires
but is unable to employ counsel and in which counsel is assigned in the
superior court, municipal court, or justice court to represent such a person
in a criminal trial, proceeding or appeal, such counsel, in a county or city
and county in which there is no public defender, or in a case in which the
court finds that because of conflict of interest or other reasons the public
defender has properly refused to represent the person accused, shall receive a reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary expenses, the
amount of which shall be determined by the court, to be paid out of the
general fund of the county.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1979).

253. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 575, 577, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (1979) (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 786, 567 P.2d 750, 140 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1977). Judicial discretion is decisions based upon reason and law. Discretion implies that in absence of
positive law or a fixed rule, the judge is to decide a question by his view of expediary or in the demand of equity and justice. Discretion is a cool mind, free from
partiality.).
254. 95 Cal. App. 3d at 575, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
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32. IN RE STEVEN B.
25 Cal. 3d 1, 598 P.2d 480, 157 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1979)
Steven B. was charged with violating Vehicle Code section
20001 and 20003 (hit and run). During the jurisdictional hearing,
Steven moved for acquittal on the ground that the prosecution
had failed to prove every element of the hit and run offense. The
court denied the motion and sustained the charges, placing
Steven on probation without making him a ward of the court. After an appeal was filed, the court reporter who had recorded the
proceeding, discovered that his notes of the second day of the
hearing had been inadvertently destroyed. Steven moved to set
25 5
aside the judgment and requested a new jurisdictional hearing.
The Welfare and Institutions Code section 677,256 provides that
the court reporter "shall" take down all the testimony and all of
the statements and remarks of the judge and all persons appearing at the hearing. The proceedings "must" be transcribed by the
court reporter upon the request of the court, the minor, or the mi257
nor's parent or attorney.
The court cited In re David T.258 and In re Andrew M.259 as being analogous to the case at bar wherein the court reporter
breached the duty imposed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 677.260 It was found that through no fault of their own, the
255. In re Steven B., 25 Cal. 3d 1, 3-4, 598 P.2d 480, 481, 157 Cal. Rptr. 510, 511
(1979). See also CAL.CIv. PROC. CODE § 914 (West Supp. 1979).
256. Section 677 states:
At any juvenile court hearing conducted by a juvenile court judge, an official court reporter shall, and at any such hearing conducted by a juvenile
court referee, the official reporter, as directed by the court, may take down
in shorthand all the testimony and all of the statements and remarks of
the judge and all persons appearing at the hearings; and, if directed by the
judge, or requested by the person on whose behalf the petition was
brought, or by his parent or legal guardian, or the attorneys of such persons, he must, within such reasonable time after the hearing of the petition as the court may designate, write out the same or such specific
portions thereof as may be requested in plain and legible longhand or by
typewriter or other printing machine and certify to the same as being correctly reported and transcribed. ...
CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 677 (West 1972).
257. 25 Cal. 3d at 4, 598 P.2d at 482, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
258. 55 Cal. App. 3d 798, 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1976). Failure by the court to appoint an officially licensed court reporter constituted reversible error as the minor
was thereby denied the certified transcript to which he was entitled and which
was a prerequisite to perfecting an appeal.
259. 74 Cal. App. 3d 295, 141 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1977). The court reporter neglected
to take down all arguments of counsel.
260. 25 Cal. 3d at 7, 598 P.2d at 483, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
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minor in each case was deprived of a record of the proceeding to
26 1
which he was entitled.
The court held that Steven was entitled to a new jurisdictional
hearing and noted that on appeal there must be an adequate record upon which to refer in order to render judgments on subsequent questions, especially where the sufficiency of evidence is
challenged. 262 A substantial portion of the original hearing was
missing and there was no adequate substitute for the complete
record. The court further reasoned that the burden of requiring a
new hearing was minimal in comparison to the importance of ensuring that justice was done with an adequate record on ap263
peal.

33.

IN RE ADOLPHUS

T.

96 Cal. App. 3d 642, 158 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1979)
The 17-year-old minor appeared with his counsel, admitted to
one count of armed robbery, and obtained a dismissal of two
other counts of armed robbery. Adolphus T. was committed to
the Youth Authority. In warning the minor of his rights, the referee did not specifically tell Adolphus T. that anything he said
could be used against him. Also, it was not ascertained whether
the minor's mother consented to the admission.
The minor claims that his "admission must be vacated because
the referee: (a) did not adequately inform him of his rights
against selfincrimination, (b) did not adequately inform him of
his rights to have consulted with his parents prior to the admission, (c) did not ascertain whether the minor's mother consented
to the admission, and (d) did not ascertain whether the minor's
counsel consented. The court of appeal found all these claims to
be entirely without merit."264
The court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 248,
and California Rules of Court, rule 1317,265 requiring advise of the
juvenile of his right to seek review of a referee's order by a juvenile court judge were not applicable in the case at bar. The only
orders of the referee were to dismiss two counts of burglary and
continue the case for dispositional hearing on the other count of
261.

Id. at 7, 598 P.2d at 483-84, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 514.

262. Id. at 8, 598 P.2d at 484, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
263. Id. at 9, 598 P.2d at 485, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
264. In re Adolphus T., 96 Cal. App. 3d 642, 645, 158 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1979).
265. California's Welfare and Institutions Code, section 248 and rule 1317 of the
California Rules of Court require that a minor be advised that he has a right to
seek review by a juvenile court judge of a referee's order. This is necessary to
avoid unfairness and unlawful discrimination, and is mandatory.
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266
armed robbery.
The court also held that the referee's failure to advise the minor
erthat anything he said could be used against him is a technical 268
ror,267 but not of constitutional import and was thus harmless.
The minor's counsel had apparently consented to the admission, 269 as did as his mother.270 Five weeks had elapsed between
the jurisdictional hearing and the dispositional hearing, during
which the minor, his counsel, and his parents were aware of the
alleged deficiencies in the jurisdictional hearing and made no objection.

34.

IN RE FREDDIE R.

96 Cal. App. 3d 829, 158 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1979)
The juvenile court entered an order sustaining a petition charging Freddie R. with assault with a deadly weapon and committed
him to the Youth Authority. The minor filed a timely application
for rehearing and the court found good cause for extending time
for ruling.
The sole issue was whether the juvenile court must articulate
its reasons for "good cause" recited in its order extending time
under section 252 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The statute in pertinent part provides:
If an application for rehearing is not granted within 20 days following the
date of its receipt, it shall be deemed denied. However, the court, for good
cause, may extend such period beyond 20 days, but not in any event beyond 45 days, following the date of receipt of the application .... 271

In re Danny T.272 is controlling in this case. The court found in
Danny T. that it was the legislature's intent to require articulated
266. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 645, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
267. CAL. RULES OF COURT 1354(a).
268. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
269. CAL. RULES OF COURT 1354(a). Counsel with a minor at a jurisdictional
hearing, and voicing no opposition to juvenile's admission, evidences counsel's
consent to the admission, because no admission shall be accepted unless counsel
consents.
270. CAL. RULES OF COURT 1354(c) (2). A juvenile court referee has no duty to
seek or obtain the consent of a minor's parents before accepting a minor's admission to a charge.
271. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 252 (West Supp. 1979). See also In re Edgar M.,
14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975).
272. 22 Cal. 3d 918, 587 P.2d 712, 150 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1978). A request for rehearing that was neither denied nor extended for good cause within 20 days and was
deemed granted.
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reasons to support a given decision. 273 This operates as a guard
against careless decisions and automatic extensions. 274 This insures that the judge will engage in a careful decision making proc2 75
ess that is essential to appellate review of the decision.
The appellate court reversed and the juvenile court was directed to enter an order granting the minor's application for a
hearing de novo because the court did not articulate its reasons
for good cause.
35.

IN RE RAY O.

97 Cal. App. 3d 136, 158 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1979)
A minor pled guilty to two counts of burglary and the trial court
dismissed the third count pursuant to a plea bargain. The judge
at the dispositional hearing committed the minor to the Youth
Authority. The judge who presided over the dispositional hearing
did not preside at the jurisdictional hearing. Furthermore, a court
reporter was not present at the dispositional hearing to preserve
the oral proceedings.
The court held that failure to provide a'reporter's transcript at
the dispositional hearing constituted error 276 under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 677.277 Without a record, the appellate
court was "unable to determine whether or not the juvenile court
abused its discretion in sending Ray 0. to CYA."278
The issue also arose as to whether a juvenile is entitled to have
the same judge preside at both jurisdictional and dispositional
hearings when there is a plea bargain. 279 "In the absence of a
clear waiver, 280 whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a
judge he has the right to be sentenced by the same judge." 28 1 If
273. Id. at 921, 587 P.2d at 713-14, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 917-18.
274. In re Freddie R., 96 Cal. App. 3d 829, 832, 158 Cal. Rptr. 260, 262 (1979).
275. In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 937, 544 P.2d 1297, 1311, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97, 111
(1976). The court was required to give a statement of reasons for denying bail on
appeal.
276. In re Ray 0., 97 Cal. App. 3d 136, 138, 158 Cal. Rptr. 550, 550-51 (1979).
277. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 677 (West Supp. 1979). A juvenile is entitled to
complete reporter's transcript. Without the transcript, the record is simply inadequate to enable an appellate court to pass upon the issue of proper disposition.
See People v. Apalatequi, 82 Cal. App. 3d 970, 147 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1978).
278. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 551. See also In re David T., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 802, 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1976).
279. Where an adult is the defendant, the supreme court, in People v. Arbuckle,
22 Cal. 3d 749, 587 P.2d 220, 150 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1978) held that an implicit term of
the plea bargain is that the trial judge will be the sentencing judge.
280. 97 Cal. App. 3d 136, 158 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1979). Counsel for a juvenile who
enters a plea bargain before one judge and finds another judge presiding at the
dispositional hearing, should seek transfer of the matter to the original judge.
Otherwise the juvenile may be precluded from raising the issue on appeal.
281. Id. at 139-40, 158 Cal. Rptr. 551-52.
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the internal court administrative procedures render that impossible, then, in the alternative, "the minor should be permitted to
withdraw his admission of burglary." 282 With the withdrawal of
admission, "the prosecution shall have the right to reinstate the
'283
dismissed count.

36. IN RE GLEN J.
97 Cal. App. 3d 981, 159 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1979)
Glen J., age 15, was found to be a person coming within Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602284, following his admission of
crimes of burglary and vandalism. The minor was committed to a
boys ranch for ninety days. The probation officer later applied for
a modification of this dispositional order to provide for an indefinite time of commitment. The probation officer recited that the
minor "'failed' the ninety day program but 'could be helped' in
the indefinite program." 285 The juvenile court so modified the order.
On appeal, the minor asserts that a supplemental petition is required to order the modification. The applicable part of California
Welfare and Institutions Code, section 777, states: "An order
changing ... a previous order . . . by directing commitment to
286
the Youth Authority shall be made only after noticed hearing."
The Third District Court of Appeal decided that the "modifica -

tion did not come within the literal terms of section

777."287

The

ensuing modification did not remove the minor from his parents
or commit him to a county institution. That had already been
done by the original disposition. "The modification merely maintained the status quo established by the original order in respect
to responsibility for the minor's custody but changed the place
288
and duration of the commitment."
The court of appeal also found that the minor was not placed in
double jeopardy by these proceedings. Modification of a disposi282. Id. at 140, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
283. Id.
284. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 provides that any minor under
the age of 18 is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and can be declared a

ward of the court when he violates any criminal law or ordinance. CAL. WEU. &
INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
285. In re Glen J., 97 Cal. App. 3d 981, 984, 159 Cal. Rptr. 148, 149 (1979).
286. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 777 (West Supp. 1979).
287. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
288. Id.
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tional order does not constitute double jeopardy. 289 There was
but one jurisdictional hearing and as such; "he was subject to the
2 90
court's continuing jurisdiction."

37. IN RE MICHAEL C.
98 Cal. App. 3d 117, 159 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1979)
Michael C. was declared a ward of the court on the basis of
commission of burglary. The juvenile filed a petition for a rehearing, however the juvenile'court extended its time to rule on the
petitions for rehearing twenty five days beyond the twenty day
time limitation set out in Welfare and Institutions Code section
252.291 The reason for the extension was that there was a delay in
the preparation of the transcripts.
At issue was whether the extension of the time period stated
reasons adequate to establish good cause. The Second District
Court of Appeal, citing In re Danny T.,292 held that "[i]t is doubtful" that a delay in the preparation of a transcript should constitute good cause. 293 There was no indication of any extraordinary
circumstances which necessitated the delay.
The court pointed out that there may be some unique circumstances which may be deemed good cause for an extension, but
the court would not "permit an exception to be made for transcripts which appear to require routinely or extended period of
time for preparation," 294 especially since delay in transcript prep295
aration is probably the most common reason for extension.
IV.

JURISDICTION

38. IN RE DONALD B.
89 Cal. App. 3d 804,152 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1979)
Between the time Donald was found to be a juvenile within the
meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602296 (which
289. Id. at 197, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
290. Id.
291. Welfare and Institutions Code section 352 requires the court to rule on the
petition within 20 days. This period may be extended to 45 days for good cause.
CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 352 (West Supp. 1979).

292. 22 Cal. 3d 918, 587 P. 2d 712, 150 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1978).
293. Id. at 921 n.3, 587 P.2d at 713 n.3, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 917 n.3.
294. In re Michael C., 98 Cal. App. 3d 117, 123, 159 Cal. Rptr. 306, 309 (1979).
295. Id.
296. Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code reads as follows:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
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established juvenile court jurisdiction), and the date set for disposition, defendent reached his 18th birthday and committed a
crime for which he was sentenced as an adult.
The sole issue considered by the Second District Court of Appeal was whether the commission of an adult crime while juvenile
offenses remained unsentenced served to strip the juvenile court
of jurisdiction to sentence for the juvenile offenses.
Citing In re Larry T.,297 the court of appeal "refused to allow
the commission of an adult crime by one just having reached 18
years of age, who has as yet unsentenced offenses as a juvenile, to
use the adult crime as a means by which to entirely escape pun298
ishment for the juvenile offenses."
The court concluded that when the record reveals that the juvenile court has not acted due to dissatisfaction with the sentence
imposed by the superior court, the juvenile court retains jurisdic299
tion over the juvenile offenses.
39. IN RE CARLO S.
94 Cal. App. 3d 377, 156 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1979)
The juvenile court found that Carlo S. obstructed a police officer
in the discharge of his duties in violation of Penal Code section
148; the court granted Carlo probation. The record disclosed that
the minor was accused by petition of committing assault likely to
produce great bodily injury in violation of Penal Code section 245.
The section 148 offense was not charged in the original petition
and was not raised by amendment. The minor was never given
previous notice of the section 148 offense. At the proceedings, the
minor remained silent, neither consenting nor objecting to the juvenile court's determination of his offense.
The question presented is whether a juvenile court may, without appropriate amendment to the charging petition or previous
notice to the minor, find him "guilty" of an uncharged and unincluded lesser offense, in cases where the minor remains silent
and made no objections to the procedure. The answer was a succinct no.
The court of appeal noted that due process requires that a mi§ 602 (West 1972).
297. 77 Cal. App. 3d 969, 144 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1 978).
298. In re Donald B., 89 Cal. App. 3d 804, 807, 152 Cal. Rptr. 868, 870 (1979).
299. Id.

CAL.WELF.& INST. CODE
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nor and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing.
The written notice must be given at the earliest practicable time,
at least sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit prepara300
tion.
The court went on to state that a person cannot be convicted of
an offense not officially charged, other than a necessarily included
offense, whether or not there was evidence at his trial to show
that he had committed that offense. 30 1 The court in such a situation lacks jurisdiction to so convict the accused. 302 "[W] here the
court is without jurisdiction,an accused, by his 'silence' or 'acquiescence,' may not confer it. Lack of jurisdiction may not be
303
waived or stipulated.
40.

PEOPLE V. SUPERIOR COURT OF HUMBOLDT COUNTY (JOHN

D.)

95 Cal App. 3d 380, 157 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979)
A juvenile court found that John D. had committed second degree murder. The original petition alleged that the minor was
within the juvenile court's jurisdiction under section 602,304 which
provides for wardship of juvenile criminal offenders. The court
also considered the minor's sanity at the time of the offense. During the proceedings, the minor's parents filed a petition under
section 300, subdivision (c), 30 5 to have him declared a dependent
child of the court in that because of his mental disorders, John D.
300. In re Carlo S., 94 Cal. App. 3d 377, 380, 156 Cal. Rptr. 442, 443 (1979). Constitutional guarantee of due process applies to proceedings in which juveniles are
charged as delinquents. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
301. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 443. See In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171,
288 P.2d 5 (1955). A minor was charged with the crime of rape. A verdict was
returned finding the minor guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The court reasoned that since rape can be committed without contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
is not necessarily included in rape. The court held that due process requires notice of the charges and since notice of the delinquency charge was not given, the
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in entering a judgment of conviction for the
delinquency offense.
302. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
303. People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 598-99, 339 P.2d 202, 203 (1959).
304. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).

305. Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (c) states:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court:
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"presented a danger to society." 306
The court found the minor to be legally insane both at the time
of the offense and at the time of hearing. The court sustained the
dependency petition, ordered the minor placed in a hospital pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.3,307 and dismissed the wardship petition under section 602 on grounds that
the allegations were untrue because of the minor's insanity.
Petitioner asserted that the section 702.3 commitment must be
based on the court's jurisdiction over the minor as a ward rather
than as a dependent child. Petitioner claimed that by ordering
the 702.3 commitment under section 300, subdivision (c), rather
than section 602, the court exceeded its jurisdiction.
The appellate court declared that whether a section 602 petition,
is viewed as sustained and in effect suspended when the minor is found
not guilty by reason of insanity or declared 'not true' by reason of such
finding, we hold that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity on a 602
petition does not per se deprive the juvenile court of the power to make an
otherwise valid commitment order under section 702.3, and that such petition carries with
30 8 it continuing jurisdiction justifying disposition under the
latter section.

The court held that the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction
by making an indefinite commitment pursuant to a finding of
309
mere dependency.
The court found that section 702.3 regarding indefinite commitment, makes no reference to section 300 dealing with dependent
children of the court.3 10 Section 702.3 addresses itself only to mi(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or
physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (c) (West Supp. 1979).
306. People v. Superior Court of Humboldt County (John D.), 95 Cal. App. 3d
380, 384, 157 Cal. Rptr. 157, 159 (1979). Although the petition was filed by the minor's parents rather than the probation officer, thereby violating the outlined procedure, this did not of itself deprive the court jurisdiction to consider the petition.
307. Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.3 provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law:
(a) When a minor denies, by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity,
the allegations of a petition filed pursuant to Section 602 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, and also joins with that denial a general denial of
the conduct alleged in the petition, he shall first be subject to a hearing as
if he had made no allegation of insanity. If the petition is sustained or if
the minor denies the allegations only by reason of insanity, then a hearing
shall be held on the question of whether the minor was insane at the time
the offense was committed.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 702.3 (West Supp. 1979).
308. 95 Cal. App. 3d 380, 391, 157 Cal. Rptr. 157, 164 (1979).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 392, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
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nors found not guilty by reason of insanity after the establishment of an offense charged in a 602 petition. The court declared
that if a "602 petition were properly dismissed, the 702.3 commitment was beyond the power of the court based upon any purported jurisdiction derived from section 300." 311

41. IN RE VICKI H.
99 Cal. App. 3d 484, 160 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1979)
Vicki came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions
Code section 602312 because of the commission of an assault with
a deadly weapon and battery. The court had adjudged the minor
to be insane at the time of the offense and had her committed to
the Youth Authority. The commitment was suspended upon her
voluntary admission into a state hospital.
Vicki refused to remain voluntarily committed at the state hospital and the court modified its previous order and declared her a
ward of the court. The court found she needed intensive longterm care for mental disorders, but was not so gravely disabled as
to fit within the meaning of the Laterman-Petris-Short Act. 313 The
act sets up provisions concerning a person with a mental disorder
who is a danger to others, or to himself.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court
decision and ordered the minor to be discharged from any detention in a state hospital.
Citing In re M.G.S.,314 the court held that "the insanity defense
divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction once it is successfully
proven." 3 15 Since the juvenile court found Vicki to be insane it
lost its jurisdiction and thereby erred in ordering the minor committed to the state hospital. 316
The court concluded that the juvenile court did not have the inherent power to commit the minor to the state hospital because
she did not fall within the provision of the Laterman-Petris-Short
311. Id. at 391, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
312. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 provides that any minor under
the age of 18 is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and can be declared a
ward of the court when he violates any criminal law or ordinance. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
313. The LPS Act provides that mentally disordered persons may be taken into
custody for a 72-hour treatment and evaluation. Thereafter, the person may be detained for 14 days of intensive treatment under certain circumstances.
After these periods, persons cannot be involuntarily committed for a longer span
unless: (1) patients agree to voluntary commitment; (2) a temporary conservator
has been appointed; (3) or the parties fall within article 6 of Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 5254, 5264. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 (West 1972).
314. 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 72 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1978).
315. In re Vicki H., 99 Cal. App. 3d 484, 491, 160 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297 (1979).
316. Id. at 492, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
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Act. Commitment under such circumstances, would result in a
3
"denial of an individual's liberty." 17
V. EVIDENCE

42. IN RE DARREL T.
90 Cal. App. 3d 325, 153 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1979)
Darrel T. was committed to the California Youth Authority
(CYA) upon a finding that he had committed murder on a conspiracy theory. 318 In this case, defendant was denied a transcript
of a fitness hearing-involving a codefendant whose trial had been
severed. Defendant also argued that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court allowed the codefendant to invoke his privilege against self incrimination.
The Second District Court of Appeal examined the factual issues present in the codefendant fitness hearing and determined
them to be remote from those in the instant case. 319 The court
concluded there was nothing material to the ultimate adjudication
of the minor's guilt or innocence that had transpired at the code32 0
fendant's fitness hearing.
Another issue confronting the court was whether the testimony
of the accomplices should have been excluded because they were
not corroborated. The court concluded that Penal Code section
1111321 did not apply to a juvenile court jurisdictional or adjudicatory hearing. 322 A member of a conspiracy to assault is liable for
317. Id. at 499, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
318. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
319. In this case, defendant was denied a transcript, not of a prior trial, but
of a fitness hearing involving a codefendant whose trial had been severed.
The facts presented in McDaniels' [the codefendant] fitness hearing are
remote from those in the instant case.
In re Darrel T., 90 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. 261, 265 (1979).
320. Id. at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
321. Penal Code section 1111 provides in pertinent part:
A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it
can be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 1970).
322. Under Penal Code section 1111 accomplice testimony must be corroborated. However, it has repeatedly been held (most recently in In re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 949, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144 (1978)) that this
section does not apply to a juvenile court jurisdiction or adjudicatory
hearing.
Id. at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 265. In In re Mitchell P., the California Supreme Court
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all actions of his co-conspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. 323 The court allowed admission of uncorroborated statements of evidence, although circumstantial. They were found
324
clearly sufficient to support the conspiracy finding.
Finally, the court determined that the minor was not denied a
fair trial in spite of the fact that the trial court allowed the codefendant to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant was found to have failed
to cite any authority for his unique and unusual proposition that his right
to produce witnesses outweighs a witness' right against self incrimination.
Theoretically, McDaniels could have been granted immunity. However,
did not request that McDaniels be given immunity by the trial
defendant
325
court.

43. IN RE CLYDE H.
92 Cal. App. 3d 338, 154 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979)
Clyde H. was declared a ward of the court when he committed
assault in violation of Penal Code section 242, by throwing a brick
at a young child. The record indicated that the eleven year old
minor, had been involved in a similar incident. The minor later
apologized to his guardian for his conduct, evidencing that he
knew such conduct was wrong. The probation officer's report
stated that the minor's mother, with whom the guardian lived,
and the guardian, had been unsuccessful at disciplining the minor
and recommended rehabilitation outside of the home. The minor
contended the evidence was not sufficient to show that he knew
his conduct was wrongful.
The court of appeal held that Penal Code section 26, subdivision
must be satisfied to sustain a finding that a minor under the
age of fourteen is a ward of the court within the provisions of
1,326

determined that there is no due process violation where section 1111 of the Penal
Code is not applied because the rule is not constitutionally based, but was created
by the common law. In reMitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 587 P.2d 1144, 151 Cal. Rptr.
330 (1978).
323. People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966). See
also People v. Steccone, 36 Cal. 2d 234, 223 P.2d 17 (1950). The court there held
that it is not necessary to show that the parties met and actually agreed to perform the unlawful acts nor that there was a detailed plan.
324. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (1979).
325. Id. at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
326. California Penal Code section 26, Subdivision one provides:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to
the following classes:
(1) Children under the age of fourteen, in the absence of clear proof that
at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its
wrongfulness.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(1) (West Supp. 1980).
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Welfare & Institutions Code section 602.327 The court concluded
that there was substantial evidence to indicate that Clyde H.
knew the wrongfulness of his conduct and hence affirmed the con328
clusion of the trier of fact.
44. IN RE CHARLES G.
95 Cal. App. 3d 62, 156 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1979)
A petition was filed in juvenile court alleging that Charles G.
committed burglary of a vehicle. Charles was found in the seat of
a truck in a parking lot and three tools which had been inside the
glove compartment of the truck were found nearby. The owner
testified that to the best of his knowledge the automobile was
locked in accordance with his normal practice. The court found
the allegation to be true and Charles appealed, contending that
the substantial evidence rule violates federal due process and
that there was no substantial evidence to sustain a finding that
the automobile was locked.
The appellate court noted that the substantial evidence rule
was the test on appeal 329 and rejected the contention that the
33
substantial evidence rule violates federal due process. o
The appellate court rejected the second contention on the basis
of Evidence Code section 1105,331 which clearly allows the victim's
testimony concerning his habit of locking automobile doors. The
court stated that from the circumstantial evidence of habit, and
reasonable inferences therefrom, the judge could have properly
33
concluded that the truck was locked. 2
327. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 defines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This section provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1980).
328. In re Clyde H., 92 Cal. App. 3d 343, 344, 154 Cal. Rptr. 727, 730 (1979).
329. See In re Roderick P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 500 P.2d 1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972).
The appellate court can give credit only to substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence which reasonably inspires confidence.
330. In re Charles G., 95 Cal. App. 3d 62, 65, 156 Cal. Rptr. 832, 834 (1979).
331. Section 1105 provides that "any otherwise admissable evidence of habit or
custom is admissable to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with
the habit or custom."
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1105 (West 1966).
332. 95 Cal. App. at 67, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (1979).
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45. IN RE DAVID G.
93 Cal. App. 3d 247, 155 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1979)
A wardship petition alleged that David G. was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a result of seven alleged violations
of Penal Code section 459.333 The minor denied these allegations
and moved to suppress the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.334 The motion was denied and the court subsequently
found David G. to be a juvenile under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.335 The minor appealed the order denying
his motion to suppress and the order declaring him a ward of the
court. At a later dispositional hearing, a juvenile court referee entered a dispositional order continuing the minor as a ward of the
juvenile court and placing him on probation.
Two questions are presented: (1) Does Penal Code section
1538.5 apply to juvenile proceedings so that a minor who admits
the allegations of a wardship petition may obtain appellate review
of the denial of his motion to suppress? (2) Do the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution article I, section 7 and
the United States Constitution fourteenth amendment require
that a minor be given the same right of appellate review following
admission of the petition's allegations as is given to a defendant
who pleads guilty to a criminal offense?
With regard to the first question, the appellate court held that
333. This section pertains to auto burglary.
334. This section pertains to motions for the return of property or for the suppression of evidence. The main concern of this case is subdivision (m) which allows one to test the unreasonableness of a search or seizure before trial. Penal
Code section 1538.5, subdivision (m) reads as follows:
The proceedings provided for in this section, Section 995, Section 1238, and
Section 1466 shall constitute the sole and exclusive remedies prior to conviction to test the reasonableness of a search or seizure where the person
making the motion for the return of property or the suppression of evidence is a defendant in a criminal case and the property or thing has been
offered or will be offered as evidence against him. A defendant may seek
further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that such judgment of
conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty. Such review on appeal may
be obtained by the defendant providing that at some stage of the proceeding prior to conviction he has moved for the return of property or the suppression of the evidence.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (m) (West Supp. 1979).
335. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 provides that a juvenile court
will have jurisdiction over, and can declare minors who commit crimes wards of
the court. The section reads:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of
this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew
based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
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Penal Code section 1538.5 is inapplicable to juvenile court proceedings. 336 The minor relied on subdivision (m) of section 1538.5
as ground for a review of the ruling for suppression of evidence.
The people argued that "section 1538 could not apply to juvenile
proceedings because that section makes reference solely to criminal cases, whereas wardship proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 are civil proceedings." 337 The court's
attention was to Welfare and Institutions Code section 203, which
provides "an order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile
court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose,
nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal
338
proceeding."
The appellate court analyzed the language of section 1538.5 concluded that such language precluded its application to juvenile
wardship proceedings. 339 'The statute provides that a 'defendant'
may move to suppress as evidence anything obtained as a result
of a search or seizure (Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision [a];
and that the proceedings shall constitute the sole and exclusive
remedies prior to 'conviction' where the person making the motion is a defendant in a 'criminal case' (Penal Code section 1538.5,

subdivision

[m])"340

As to the second question, the court acknowledged that the
state had created a particular classification but determined that
the classification was constitutional. 34 1 The court noted that the
Constitution does not require that wardship procedures be identical to procedures utilized in criminal prosecutions against
adults. 342 Disparities not directly affecting fundamental rights are
343
permissable when reasonably related to a proper purpose.
The appellate court held that the statute did not directly affect
336. In re David G., 93 Cal. App. 3d 247, 252, 155 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (1979).
337. Id.
338. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West Supp. 1979).
339. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 252, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (1979).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 253, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
342. The Constitution does not require that the procedures in wardship
proceedings be identical to the procedures employed in criminal prosecutions against adults; disparities which do not directly affect a fundamental
right are constitutionally permissible when reasonably related to a proper
purpose.
Id.
343. See In re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 587 P.2d 1144, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1978).
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fundamental rights. 344 Section 1538.5 was enacted to alleviate the
large demand on jury time in hearing search and seizure objections. 'There is no jury in juvenile court; therefore, litigation of
search and seizure at an adjudication hearing would not waste

jury time."3 4 5 Thus, the court concluded that the legislative clas-

sification could not be deemed wholly irrational. 34 6 The appellate
court commented in a footnote that it was not suggesting that a
minor should not be given this right347 it deferred this aspect for
future legislative determination.
46. IN RE FREDERICK G.
96 Cal. App. 3d 353, 157 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1979)
A minor, age seventeen, was found guilty of murder in the second degree. During the trial, a witness who was present at the
scene of the crime gave testimony that was somewhat contradictory of other statements she had made and of testimony by
others. During the trial, the witness was granted immunity from
prosecution only as to her admission of heroin use.
Appellant's main argument is that the rule requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony should be applicable in a juvenile court proceeding. 348 The application of Penal Code § 1111
would require a reversal of appellant's conviction of murder, but
the court has ruled in the case of In re Mitchell P.349 that the rule
requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony is not applicable in a juvenile court proceeding. In essence, the court held
that the witness "was not technically an accomplice" in this
344. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 254, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (1979).
345. Id. at 255, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
346. Id.
347. We do not by this comment suggest that the minor should not be given
this right. This is a matter for legislative determination. It may well have
been an oversight and, if so, it should be corrected promptly by the legislature.
Id. at 255 n.3, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 504 n.3.
348. Penal Code section 1111 deals with conviction on testimony of accomplice.
The section in its entirety provides:
A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it
be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for
the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in
which the testimony of the accomplice is given.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 1970).

349. In re Mitchell P. involved a minor charged with burglary, grand theft and
receiving stolen property. An accomplice was granted immunity. The California
Supreme Court held that "a finding of wardship pursuant to section 602 does not
constitute a 'conviction' within the meaning of Penal Code section 1111,...." In
re Mitchell P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 949, 587 P.2d 1144, 1146, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 333 (1978).
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case. 350 "An accomplice is one 'who is liable to prosecution for
the identical offense charged against the defendant .... '",351
Next the court considered the contradictions in the witness' testimony. Contradictions in the record in connection with the witness' testimony do not render the testimony impossible or
unbelievable, but only create a conflict that goes to the credibility
35 2
of testimony.

47. IN RE JOHNNY G.
25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979)
A minor appeals from an order adjudging him a ward of the
court upon a finding that he committed assault with a deadly
353
weapon.
The prosecution introduced an extrajudicial statement made by
the victim to a police officer where the victim supposedly identified the minor as the person who attacked him. On cross-examination, the victim said he did not know who attacked him.
The minor challenged the decision, contending that the victim's
prior inconsistent identification was insufficient to sustain an order adjudging him to be a ward of the juvenile court.
The California Supreme Court referred to its decision in People
v. Gould354 where it held that "[a]n extra-judicial identification
that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is
[in] sufficient [sic] to sustain a conviction in the absence of other
'355
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.
Since the only evidence connecting the minor with the charged
assault was such an identification, the order appealed from can356
not stand.
The court also pointed out that further proceedings were barred
by the double jeopardy clause. 357 "Since the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the finding that the minor committed the offense charged, further proceedings are barred by the
350.
(1979).
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

In re Frederick Joseph G., 96 Cal. App. 3d 353, 367, 157 Cal. Rptr. 769, 778

Id.
Id. at 369, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
In re Johnny G., 25 Cal. 3d 543, 601 P.2d 196, 159 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1979).
54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P. 2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960).
Id. at 631, 354 P. 2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
25 Cal. 3d at 548, 601 P. 2d at 197, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
Id. at 548, 601 P.2d at 199, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
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Double Jeopardy clause

....

"358

48. IN RE JOSEPH H.
98 Cal. App. 3d 627, 159 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1979)
Joseph was charged with leaving the scene of an accident. 359
The minor was driving a neighbor's car and struck two parked
cars. A witness watched the driver leave the scene but was unable to identify him. A police officer observed the incident and
saw the juvenile run into a house, found the juvenile, and returned to the scene with him. In the minor's testimony, the boy
admitted being involved in the accident but claimed he left the
scene in order to get help.
After presentation of the prosecution's case, Joseph moved for
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.360 He

contends that "the denial of the motion was erroneous because at
the close of the prosecution's case there was no evidence that Joseph was the driver of the car."36 '
The First District Court of Appeal held Penal Code section 1118
inapplicable to juvenile court proceedings. The court pointed out
that inasmuch as a juvenile has no right to a jury in a wardship
proceeding, he cannot waive a jury.362 Even if section 1118 ap-

plied, the purpose of the section was to terminate the case when
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, but the trial
court held there was substantial evidence in the record to support
the conclusions of the trial court.
358. Id.
359. 98 Cal. App. 3d 627, 630, 159 Cal. Rptr. 681, 682 (1979). See also CAL. VEH.
CODE § 20002(a) (West 1971).
360. Penal Code section 1118 provides:
In a case tried by the court without a jury, a jury having been waived, the
court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the
accusatory pleading after the evidence of the prosecution has been closed
if the court, upon weighing the evidence then before it, finds the defendant not guilty of such offense or offenses. If such a motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is not
granted, the defendant may offer evidence without first having reserved
that right.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1118 (West 1970).
361. 98 Cal. App. 3d at 631, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 683 (1979).
362. Id. See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Mitchell
P., 22 Cal. 3d 946, 953, 587 P.2d 1144, 1149, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 336 (1978); In re Gladys
R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 866 n.21, 464 P.2d 127, 135 n.21, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 679 n.21 (1970).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL
49. IN RE ScoTT K.
24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1979)
The mother of Scott K. found marijuana in the minor's desk
drawer and informed police. A police officer telephoned Scott's
father to tell him that he was about to arrest Scott. The father
told the police that Scott could be found in the garage. Police officers arrested the minor without a warrant, took him into the
house, and received permission to search his room. In the room
was a locked toolbox belonging to Scott and with the father's consent the officers, using a key obtained from the minor, opened the
box and found marijuana inside. Scott never consented to the
search. The arrest was ruled illegal,63 but the court denied a motion to suppress the evidence found in the toolbox. The court determined the search of the box was independent of the arrest and
was conducted pursuant to a valid consent. 36 Scott K. appealed
contending that the denial of his motion to suppress was erroneous. The question presented was whether a warrantless, parentapproved, police search of a minor's personal property was permissible. 365
The California Supreme Court immediately noted that the
rights of juveniles are not as exhaustive as those of adults. The
reason generally being that the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting the health and growth of children. 366 The court was
363. The arrest was illegal because no exigent circumstances existed and there
was adequate time to secure an arrest warrant. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d
263, 545 P. 2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976). Although the information supplied
was sufficient to constitute probable cause, there were no exigent circumstances
justifying defendant's arrest in his home without a warrant.
364. These comments of the trial judge are pertinent:
I find that the father ... because of the evidence elicited as relates the
relationship vis-a-vis the father, the minor and the home, had the right to
conduct a search through whatever means were efficacious of the entirety
of his own home and anything therein contained, whether placed there by
his son or any other person; that it is not an overextension of the father's
rights to use the instrumentality of the Narcotics Division of the Los Angeles Police Department to assist him in so doing.
[T]he possessory rights to the contents of the entirety of the home ...
are at least joint possessory rights residing equally with the father and the
minor ....
In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 3d 395, 399, n.1, 595 P.2d 105, 107, n.1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 n.1
(1979).
365. Id. at 398, 595 P.2d at 106, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
366. Id. at 401, 595 P.2d at 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. 674. See also Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944).
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also quick to point out that the search and seizure laws do not appear to be inconsistent with the state's interest in the child's welfare. The court also noted that the California Court of Appeal was
correct in assuming that juveniles do enjoy the protective rights
encompassed in search and seizure. 367 The California Supreme
Court concluded that a minor's due process right must be protected even when the right imposes a burden on parents or limits
parental control. 368 Therefore, it would be incongruous to permit
parents to summarily waive their child's right to search and
seizure protections.
The court also addressed the question of whether the toolbox
search was reasonable because the father's consent qualified
under the third-party-consent exception to warrant requirements.
The court agreed with the fact that "[a] warrantless search is reasonable when consent is granted by one who has a protectable interest in the property,"369 but held that the People failed to
establish that Scott's father had such an interest in the toolbox.
The court stated that while parents may have a protectable interest in the property of their children, that fact may not be assumed, instead, it is incumbent for the people to establish that a
370
warrantless search is reasonable.
50.

IN RE EDWARD

B.

94 Cal. App. 3d 362, 156 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1979)
Edward B. was charged with being a juvenile coming under
Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code in that he had
committed robbery, burglary, and attempted burglary. After receiving his Miranda warnings, Edward admitted to the charges.
Adjudication and dispositional hearings were held before a referee of the juvenile court, and Edward was declared a ward of the
court and committed to the Youth Authority. A petition for rehearing was denied. Edward contended that it was unconstitutional to deny his request for an adjudication hearing before a
judge.
367. Id. at 402, 595 P.2d at 110, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675 (1979). See also In re Tony
C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978). The court did not permit
evidence detrimental to a minor when the minor's detention by a police officer was
based entirely on hunch and curiosity.
368. 24 Cal. 3d at 403, 595 P.2d at 109, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675 (1979). See also In re
Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468 P. 2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970). Minor waived right to
counsel when he discovered his father would have to reimburse the county for the
costs of such representation. At the time, the father was already indebted to the
county. The court held that a minor should not be permitted to waive the right to
counsel for the purpose of avoiding the reimbursement requirement.
369. Id. at 404, 595 P.2d at 110, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
370. Id. at 405, 595 P.2d at 111, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
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The court held that an adjudication hearing before a juvenile
court referee who declares a minor to be a ward of the court is not
unconstitutional when, as in this instance, 37 1 the minor's petition
for rehearing was denied by a superior court judge.

51.

IN RE KATHY

P.

25 Cal. 3d 91, 599 P.2d 65, 157 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1979)
Kathy P. was cited for violating Vehicle Code section 21804
(failure to yield right-of-way when entering a highway). She appeared in the juvenile court traffic division of the superior court
and plead not guilty. At a later hearing, a traffic hearing officer
heard testimony from the citing police officer and argument from
Kathy's father. 372 The traffic hearing officer concluded that Kathy
had committed the offense and imposed a $10 fine plus a $5 penalty assessment. A juvenile court judge denied Kathy's motion
for rehearing. A transcript of the hearing was not available to the
373
juvenile court judge, although other documents were available.
Kathy contended that the juvenile traffic hearing officer was not
constitutionally authorized to adjudicate contested cases. Under
the Welfare and Institutions Code, a juvenile court judge may appoint as traffic hearing officers one or more persons of suitable experience who need not be judges. 374 Such hearing officers are
371. 94 Cal. App. 3d 362, 365, 156 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (1979). See also In re Edgar
M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975). The referee's findings and
orders are only advisory. It is the duty of the judge to deny or accept the referee's
determinations as those of the court.
372. Kathy was represented by her father, and not by counsel.
373. These documents consisted of a notice to appear, the deposition and
hearing forms, the hearing officer's notes of the testimony, and the summarizing memo of a juvenile traffic court supervisor. 25 Cal. 3d 91, 97, 599
P.2d 65, 69, 157 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877 (1979).
Welfare and Institutions Code section 255 provides in relevant part:
The judge of the juvenile court, or in counties having more than one judge
of the juvenile court the presiding judge of the juvenile court or the senior
judge if there is no presiding judge, may appoint one or more persons of
suitable experience, who may be judges of the municipal court or justices
of the justice court or a probation officer or assistant or deputy probation
officer or assistant or deputy probation officers, to serve as traffic hearing
officers on a full-time or part-time basis. A hearing officer shall serve at
the pleasure of the appointing judge ....
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 255 (West Supp. 1979).
374. Welfare and Institutions Code section 256 reads in pertinent part:
Subject to the orders of the juvenile court, a traffic hearing officer may
hear and dispose of any and all cases wherein a minor under the age of 18
years as of the date of the alleged offense is charged with any violation of
of the Vehicle Code not declared to be a felony....
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authorized to hear and decide charges against a minor of any violation of the Vehicle Code not declared to be a felony. 37 5 A further constitutional restraint limits the hearing officer's function to
376
subordinate judicial duties.
In this case, the hearing officer was not a judge, but was a person of suitable experience. The issue then became whether the
contested traffic infraction constituted a subordinate judicial duty.
The court cited People v. Lucas37 7 as authority for the proposition that traffic infractions are "subordinate" in nature. Lucas
noted that punishments for infractions are considerably lighter
than for other offenses. The Lucas court stated:
The Legislature had valid reasons to conclude that the unique and specialized function of trying infraction cases was something which constituted a
separate class of judicial service, which could properly be ranked as
"subordinate" in relation to the diversity and complexity of the other du378
ties of a municipal court judge.

The California Supreme Court also stated that the differing dispositional provisions available to minors as compared to adults were
not of sufficient magnitude to make the hearing officer's adjudication of Kathy's case more than a subordinate judicial duty.
Hence, the court concluded that the traffic hearing officers' functions were subordinate judicial duties. Also, the court apparently
determined that a hearing officer's authority extends to uncontested matters but not to contested adjudications when serious juvenile misconduct is charged.3 7 9 The adjudication in the present
case was not of a serious enough nature to remove the case from
the hearing officer.
Kathy next claimed denial of equal protection. The court quickly dismissed this claim by examining the similarity between the
functions of officers in juvenile infraction cases to those of municipal court commissioners in adult infraction cases and by noting
that the differences in qualifications of hearing officers and commissioners were justified by the differing characteristics and
needs of juvenile and adult offenders.
& INST. CODE § 256 (West Supp. 1979).
375. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 22 provides: "The Legislature may provide for the
appointment by trial courts of record of officers such as commissioners to perform
subordinate judicial duties."
376. 82 Cal. App. 3d 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1978).
377. 25 Cal. 3d at 98, 599 P.2d at 70, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78 (1979) (citing 82 Cal.
App. at 54, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
378. Id. See note 5 supra. See also Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corporation, 10 Cal. 3d 351, 515 P.2d 297, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1973); In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d
727, 537 P. 2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975).
379. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1301 (a). The rules in this division apply to every
action and proceeding to which the juvenile court law applies and, unless they are
elsewhere explicitly made applicable, do not apply to any other action or proceeding.
CAL. WELF.
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Finally, Kathy contended that reversal was required because of
the record's silence on whether she waived counsel and consented to informal adjudication. She was not claiming that counsel should have been appointed, but was relying simply on the
record's silence on whether she was advised of her right to be
represented.
The California Supreme Court stated that while Kathy had a
right to counsel retained at her own expense, no statute or rule
requires that the minor be advised of that right. 380 The court held
that absent entitlement to court-appointed counsel, due process
does not require advice of the right to appear by retained counsel
where there are no unique circumstances. The court noted that
such advice may be necessary in connection with a section 257
traffic proceeding, however, this necessity, by itself, was not
enough to require reversal simply because the record was silent
on whether the advice was given.

52.

MICHAEL M. V. SUPERIOR COURT

25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979)
Michael M., seventeen and one-half years old, engaged in unlawful intercourse with a 16 year old female. 381 At issue was
whether "statutory rape" 382 violates the equal protection clauses
of both the United States and California Constitutions, 383 because
only females are protected and only males may be prosecuted
under California law.
The supreme court found that the statute did classify both victims and defendants by sex and did protect only females while
prosecuting only the males. However, the court found that there
was a compelling state interest in this classification. 384 The court
pointed out that unwed teenage pregnancies constitute a major
contemporary problem along with the increased medical risks
which justify this classification. 385 The court went on to say that
since males are the only persons who may physiologically cause
380. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 40901(c) (West Supp. 1979).
381. Defendant was found not to be a proper subject for juvenile adjudication,
under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1978), and was charged as an
adult. 25 Cal. 3d at 610, 601 P.2d at 573, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
382. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1979).
383. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11 &21.
384. 25 Cal. 3d at 610, 601 P.2d at 573, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
385. Id. at 611, 601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
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the pregnancy, criminal sanctions can be imposed. 386
53.

IN RE WAYNE J.

97 Cal. App. 3d 776, 159 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1979)
Wayne J., seventeen years old, was charged with possession of
not more than one ounce of marijuana. The trial court declared
the minor a ward of the court and placed him on home probation.
Wayne challenges the constitutionality of a home placement
whereas an adult violator would be placed on probation with a
387
$100 fine.
The court held the distinction between placement of a juvenile
in the home and the imposition of probation or a fine on an adult
who violates the same statute, is a reasonable one that is necessary to facilitate the purposes of the juvenile court.388 Citing In re
Harm R.,389 the court stated that "[u]ntil such time as we are to
impose on the entire juvenile court system all the procedures prescribed in the adult criminal code, some distinctions between the
juvenile court and the adult criminal court must exist. We find
390
the current situation to come within that category."
In determining this distinction, the court considered the involvement of the probation officer, the court's authority to impose
home placement and the primary purpose of minority adjudication. "Thus, while an adult may be given summary probation,
there is no room in the Juvenile Court Law for such disposition;
"391

54. IN RE JESSE W.
26 Cal. 3d 41, 603 P.2d 1296, 160 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1979)
A juvenile court referee absolved the minor, Jesse W., of
charged misconduct necessary to the determination of wardship.
A rehearing was ordered by a juvenile court judge: the rehearing
before the judge would be conducted de novo. 392 Jesse claimed
that the de novo hearing would expose him to double jeopardy.
The question presented was whether the minor is exposed to
jeopardy a second time, contrary to fifth amendment prohibi386. Id. at 612, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
387. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,357(b) (West Supp. 1978); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203(c) (West 1970).
388. In re Wayne J., 97 Cal. App. 3d 776, 783, 159 Cal. Rptr. 106,110 (1979).
389. 88 Cal. App. 3d 438, 152 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1979).
390. Id. at 445, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
391. In re Wayne J., 97 Cal. App. 3d 776, 782, 159 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1979).
392. Welfare and Institutions Code section 254 states that "all rehearings of
matters heard before a referee shall be before a judge of the juvenile court and
shall be conducted de novo." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 254 (West Supp. 1979).

1056

[Vol. 4: 983, 19801

Juvenile Law Decision
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

tions, 393 if a juvenile court judge conducts a de novo rehearing
subsequent to the referee's initial findings.
The California Supreme Court unanimously answered the ques39 5
tion in the affirmative. 394 The court noted an earlier opinion
that a referee's findings and orders are advisory in nature and
that when such findings and orders are merely "reviewed" and acted upon by a juvenile court judge 396 there was no exposure to
double jeopardy. The court stated however, that "a rehearing de
novo" is in no way a review of the previous proceeding. It is a
complete new trial of the matter; the judge is no longer reviewing
and acting on the referee's recommended findings and orders.
The court held that double jeopardy existed if, after a referee had
acquitted or dismissed the petition against a minor at a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court judge then orders a de novo
hearing. The court left the matter of determining what new procedures to adopt for the legislature.
COMPILED BY:
MICHAEL

ROBERT

T.

LUBINSKI

M. TRIPLETT

393. U.S. CONST. amend. V, reads in pertinent part: No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
394. This case was remanded by the United States Supreme Court to be considered in the light of Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978). 26 Cal. 3d at 43, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 702.
395. Jesse W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 893, 576 P. 2d 963, 145 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1978).
396. Welfare and Institutions Code section 250 reads in pertinent part:
Except as provided in Section 251, all orders of a referee other than those
specified in Section 249 shall become immediately effective, subject also to
the right of review as hereinafter provided, and shall continue in full force
and effect until vacated or modified upon rehearing by order of the judge
of the juvenile court.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 250 (West Supp. 1979).
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